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FOREWORD
In recent years, attention by the U.S. national security establishment to challenges in the Western
Hemisphere has concentrated on issues of transnational organized crime, socialist populism, potential
terrorist threats, and similar challenges arising from
poverty, inequality, and weak governance in parts of
the region. As Latin America and the Caribbean nations have expanded their economic and other forms
of engagement with countries beyond the region, the
majority of attention has gone to activities in the region by the People’s Republic of China, and to a lesser
extent, by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The equally
important re-engagement with the region by the Russian Federation during this period has received less
attention, particularly among scholarly articles.
Russia’s re-engagement with the region, which began in earnest in 2008, coincided with an escalation in
tension with the United States over the role of Russia
in the civil war in Georgia and the related succession
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This led Russia to deploy nuclear-capable backfire bombers and warships
to the Caribbean, as well as initiating a wave of presidential level diplomacy and heightened cooperation
with regimes of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA). In 2014, as tensions with the United States
escalated over the conflict in the Ukraine, Russia renewed its attention to the Western Hemisphere with a
new wave of diplomatic and military activity concentrating on the relatively anti-U.S. ALBA regimes, as
well as Brazil and Argentina. In both 2008 and 2014,
Russia’s initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean seemed designed to force the United States to respond to a challenge in its own hemisphere, expanding
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Russia’s freedom of action in its own near abroad. In
the process, Russia’s actions sent an important message that U.S. security concerns in the Western Hemisphere are not only a function of dynamics occurring
in the region itself, but also in the interconnected
global security environment. Thus, U.S. decisionmakers responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean
must also consider developments in other theaters.
The present monograph by Strategic Studies Institute professor Dr. R. Evan Ellis is one of the first
in-depth treatments of contemporary Russian engagement with the countries of Latin America and its significance from a national security perspective. As such,
it provides important insights into both the nature of
the challenge posed by Russia, as well as the evolving role and persistent importance of Latin America
and the Caribbean to the national security of the
United States.
This monograph is part of the ongoing effort by
the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College to provide analysis of contemporary issues
impacting Latin America and the Carribbean and
other regional security environments, in support of
the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. decisionmakers. We hope that
readers find this work both useful and intellectually
stimulating.
			
			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement
in Latin America as a response to escalating tension
over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S.
involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet
Republic of Georgia. In the 2008 conflict, as the U.S.
deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to
Russian support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia countered with a
series of actions in Latin America, including sending
nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, from
where they conducted symbolically charged flights
around the Caribbean. This was followed a month
later by the deployment of a four-ship Russian naval
flotilla to the area to conduct military exercises with
the Venezuelan navy before making port calls in Cuba
and Nicaragua.
In addition to Russia’s military deployments, in
November 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev traveled to Latin America to participate in the
leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas, then subsequently hosted both Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months later, Bolivian President Evo Morales also traveled to Russia,
followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa.
By comparison to the extensive literature on the
activities of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War, and by contrast to the
rapidly growing body of works on China’s activities
in the region, very little beyond journalistic accounts
have been written to examine contemporary Russian
activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As
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Russia’s reassertion of its global position and associated tensions with the United States proceed apace,
a broad understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes evermore important, both as a question of U.S.
national security and as an important dynamic shaping the global geopolitical environment. This monograph seeks to do so, focusing on the character of the
ongoing Russian re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean and its implications for the
United States.
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THE NEW RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT
WITH LATIN AMERICA:
STRATEGIC POSITION, COMMERCE, AND
DREAMS OF THE PAST
OVERVIEW
In February 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu traveled to Latin America to meet with leaders
and defense officials in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The focus of meetings in all three countries was
on access to ports and airfields in the region so as to
support Russian military operations in the vicinity
of the United States. In Nicaragua, Minister Shoigu
signed an agreement to facilitate Russian access to the
ports of Corinto and Bluefields, as well as strengthening counterdrug cooperation and discussing weapons
sales. The trip advanced discussions and reinforced
the message sent by Russian President Vladimir Putin when he had traveled to the region just 7 months
previously, including Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina,
and Brazil. As the Barack Obama administration increasingly pressured Russia regarding its activities in
the Ukraine, Russia was equally capable of reasserting its presence and challenging the United States
in Latin America, the region once considered the
“U.S. backyard.”
In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement
in Latin America as a response to escalating tension
over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S.
involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet
Republic of Georgia. In that conflict, as the U.S. deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to
Russian support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia had countered with
a series of actions in Latin America. These actions
1

included sending nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to
Venezuela, from where they conducted symbolically
charged flights around the Caribbean. This was followed a month later by the deployment of a four-ship
Russian naval flotilla to the area to conduct military
exercises with the Venezuelan navy before making
port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua.
In addition to Russia’s military deployments, in
November 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev traveled to Latin America to participate in the
leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas (ALBA), then subsequently hosted both
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan
President Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months
later, Bolivian President Evo Morales also traveled
to Russia, followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian
President Rafael Correa.
Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America and
the Caribbean has proceeded unevenly since its beginning in 2008. At that time, Russia concentrated on
a limited number of countries, including the regimes
of ALBA, as well as Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, even
though it has engaged commercially, politically, and
economically with other states of the region as well.
With respect to economic interactions, by contrast
to expanding activities in the region by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), Russia’s economic activities there have been smaller and concentrated in a
more limited number of sectors, including arms sales,
petroleum, electricity production, and mining. Yet,
however uneven, Russia’s re-engagement with the region since 2008 has produced significant cumulative
results. When President Putin traveled to the region
in 2014 on a four-nation tour to send a message to the
United States over the conflict in the Ukraine, he was
not doing so from the same low base from which his
2

predecessor, Medvedev, had begun when Medvedev
launched the prior diplomatic re-engagement with
the region.
In another contrast to Chinese engagement with
Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia has not shied
away from acting in a way that overtly challenged the
United States. As noted earlier, the 2014 round of Russian re-engagement with the region began with an
announcement by Shoigu that his nation was talking
with Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela about establishing bases in those nations for resupplying Russian
warships, and potentially for refueling Russian long
range bombers. One year later, as noted previously,
the Defense Minister visited the three countries to
conduct talks regarding such base access. This was
complimented by an announcement during the same
period that Russia, for the first time, might send its
aircraft on long range patrols that would reach into
the Gulf of Mexico.
By comparison to the extensive literature on the
activities of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War, and by contrast to the
rapidly growing body of works on China’s activities
in the region, very little beyond journalistic accounts
have been written to examine contemporary Russian
activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Russia’s reassertion of its global position and associated
tensions with the United States proceed apace, a broad
understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes
evermore important, both as a question of U.S. national security and as an important dynamic shaping the
global geopolitical environment.
This monograph seeks to fill that gap, focusing
on the character of the ongoing Russian re-engage-
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ment with Latin America and the Caribbean and its
implications for the United States.
Background.
By comparison with some other extra-hemispheric
actors such as China, India, and Iran, the political and
economic relationships that Russia maintained with
Latin America and the Caribbean during the Cold
War arguably give it a substantial base of experience
in dealing with the region. Yet, Russia’s engagement
with Latin America and the Caribbean began well before the Cold War. In the 19th century, Russian officials and persons of influence affiliated with the Tsarist court recognized, in Latin American independence
movements from Spain and Portugal, an opportunity
to expand Russia’s economic and political influence
through ties to the region.1 Both Brazil, which fought
its war of independence from Portugal from February
1822 to November 1823, and Mexico, which won its
independence from Spain in 1821, sought ties with
Russia as part of their maneuverings among other
European powers.2 The Russian-American Company,
with economic interests in commerce with the region
(not unlike those of the British East India Company
in Asia), also played an important role in advancing
relations during this period.3
During the 20th century, the Russian revolution
and the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) gave rise to a mixture of sentiments
among Latin American leftists toward the new Soviet
government. The Soviet Union, for its part, nurtured
ties with leftist parties and revolutionary movements
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet, not until the
Cuban Revolution of 1959 did the region become a
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significant focus for Soviet initiatives to advance the
communist cause and the strategic position of the
USSR in its global struggle against the United States.
In many ways, the success of Fidel Castro’s revolutionary forces in seizing power in Cuba in January
1959 showed the Soviet Union the potential for leftist movements and others supportive of the USSR
to come to power by force in Latin America and the
Caribbean.4 Driven in part by such new optimism regarding the possibilities for advancing communism
and the Soviet strategic position in Latin America,
the USSR began to develop important centers of Latin
American studies during this time, such as the Latin
American Studies Institute of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Moscow.5
From the 1970s through the 1990s, the Soviet Union
provided overt and covert support for, and maintained relationships with, numerous revolutionary
movements throughout the region, including those in
El Salvador, Guatemala, Grenada, and the Dominican
Republic.6
Beyond such backing, the Soviet Union also pursued a second track of maintaining friendly ties with
leaders who, while not communist, pursued a populist or independent orientation that disposed them to
work with the USSR to varying degrees. Such figures
included Salvador Allende in Chile (until he was deposed and killed in September 1973), Juan Peron in
Argentina, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, and General Jose
Torres in Bolivia. Later examples with whom the Soviet Union collaborated to some degree included General Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru, as well as Mexican
President Luis Echeverría.7
Beyond Cuba, several countries maintained an
important military relationship with the Soviet Union
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during this period. The most prominent was Velasco,
whose Peruvian government purchased substantial
quantities of arms and received advisors from the
Soviet Union. In addition, when the Frente Sandinista
de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation
Front or FSLN) came to power in Nicaragua in 1979,
its newly triumphant revolutionary leader, Ortega,
similarly brought Soviet advisors into the country, as
well as receiving Soviet military and economic aid.8
The Soviet Union also maintained important economic relationships with more conservative regimes.
Examples include Argentina, under the military rule
of Jorge Rafael Videla, whose government became a
major supplier of grain to the USSR after 1980 when
the United States suspended its own sales of grain
to the Soviet Union.9 In a similar fashion, the Brazilian military government of João Baptista de Oliveira
Figueiredo sold feed corn to the Soviet Union.10
Beyond food sales, Soviet economic ties to the region during the Cold War included participation in
the construction of hydroelectric power plants in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia; irrigation projects in Peru
and Venezuela; and purchases of Cuban sugar, Brazilian cacao, and Colombian and Ecuadorian bananas.11
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
did not end engagement with Latin America and the
Caribbean, economic aid from the successor Russian
government to political allies such as Cuba12 and Nicaragua13 declined sharply, and diplomatic activity
in the region was similarly scaled back. As Russia’s
economy was transformed during the early post-Cold
War years, the nature of its economic engagement
with Latin America and the Caribbean shifted, focusing on a small number of industries in which the new
Russia was building global ties. These included arms,
petroleum, mining, and electricity generation.
6

During this period, the legacy of Latin America’s
strategic value to the Soviet Union was not lost to the
new generation of Russian thinkers, but rather redefined within the context of Russian global engagement. In 1997, for example, Foreign Minister Yevgeny
Primakov made a trip to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
and Costa Rica where he spoke of Latin America as a
major Russian ally in the construction of a multipolar
world.14
Russia’s legacy of engagement with Latin America
and the Caribbean during this period both contributes to, and creates challenges for its present activities
there. Part of that legacy is a group of now high-ranking (or retired) military officers, diplomats, businessmen, and others in Russia familiar with the region and
the Spanish language (as well as Portuguese to some
degree). At the same time, however, Russia’s past engagement has also left a cadre of conservative political
and business figures in influential positions in Latin
America and the Caribbean, who are deeply suspicious of Russia’s intentions as it seeks to rebuild its
ties in the region.
Fast-forwarding to the present, Russian companies
and diplomats have sought to position themselves
between a developed West and a rising Asia, with
well-known products in niche sectors such as defense,
and companies able to play by a more “flexible” set of
rules than the U.S. and European firms that they are
competing against. With the persistent and deepening hostility between Russia, the United States, and
Europe, however, Russia’s ability to position itself
between the West and Asia may be eroding.
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Motivations.
Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America arguably reflects a complex mix of often reinforcing, but occasionally conflicting, strategic, economic, and internal
political considerations. For Russia, as suggested previously, the nation’s return to Latin America and the
Caribbean is a reaction to an aggressive campaign by
the United States following the collapse of the Soviet
Union to not only bring the states of the former Warsaw Pact into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO),15 but building alliance relationships with the
Baltic States16 and other nations once part of the Soviet
Union itself. Russia believes this would bring the political and military power of its former adversary to
the very doorstep of Russia.17
By creating a political and potential military challenge close to the United States, Russia’s projection in
the hemisphere attempts to force the United States to
focus part of its attention and resources on responding
to the new vulnerability close to home, thus leaving it
with less resources and attention to challenge Russia
in its own neighborhood, or in other parts of the world.
Beyond its strategic value, re-engagement with Latin
America also arguably has benefitted Russia’s leaders
in domestic politics. Under the regimes of both Russian Presidents Medvedev and Putin, Russian military
activities in Latin America, high-level diplomacy with
Latin American leaders, and the economic projects
highlighted and facilitated by such diplomacy, demonstrate to the Russian people that the nation is overcoming the perceived tragedy of its withdrawal from
the world stage following the collapse of the Soviet
Union.18 It is now returning to a position of strength in
which Russians can take pride.
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For Medvedev in 2008, Russia’s return to Latin
America was arguably important in helping to overcome perceptions of him as a weak leader, only “keeping the presidential chair warm” until his predecessor, Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, could reclaim
power. For Putin, the latest deepening of Russia’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, including his July 2014 trip to the region, demonstrated
to Russians that his policies in the Ukraine had not isolated the nation internationally, and indeed, that they
were returning Russia to a position of international
leadership in which they could take pride. Indeed, as
Putin consolidates his power within the Russian political system and constructs a “cult of personality”
in the Russian tradition, the return to Latin America
which bears his imprimatur helps him to win his place
among a long line of Russian leaders who have built
or asserted the greatness of the Russian nation, such
as Rurik, Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Great, Ivan the
Terrible, and Peter the Great.
Within the framework of strategic and domestic
political considerations, Russia’s focus on particular
industries, such as arms, petroleum, mining, and electricity infrastructure projects is a product of the structure of Russia’s economy and the tools available to the
Russian state. In addition, it reflects the imperatives
of leading industries in the Russian economy, and the
influential figures connected to them.19
Country Focus of Re-Engagement.
As Russia has reconstructed its ties with Latin
America and the Caribbean, its limited resources and
the legacy of its activities in the region during the Cold
War has led it to concentrate its activities on three
groups of countries:
9

1. former Soviet-era allies such as Cuba and
Nicaragua,
2. the broader group of states willing to assume
the political risk of working with Russia against U.S.
influence in the region, such as Venezuela, and to a
lesser degree, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and
3. states neither opposed to the United States
or Russia, but in which Russia has a strategic
commercial interest.
In the case of the first group, although Russia
was able to leverage relationships and economic dependencies from the Cold War period, it also had to
overcome the legacy of resentment for having “abandoned” those allies. This challenge was most visible
in Cuba, where there was a widespread perception, at
least among the leadership, that the economic hardship that the island had experienced in the 1990s was
due, in part, to the Soviet Union having “stranded” it
financially.
In Nicaragua, by contrast, the communist Sandinista government was voted out of power in 1990, the
year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 2007 return to
power of Sandinista leader Ortega set the state for Nicaragua to reach out to Russia during the 2008 Georgia
crisis in an unsolicited gesture to recognize the new
breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In the process, Nicaragua earned Russian gratitude
and set the stage for the resumption of Russia-Nicaragua diplomatic interactions, as well as Russian aid.20
The difference between the group of Cold War era
Soviet client states and new Russian allies such as Venezuela is not their willingness to work explicitly with
Russia against the United States. Rather, newcomers
such as Venezuela lack a cadre of military and politi-
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cal leaders who openly collaborated with the Soviet
Union against the United States during the earlier era.
By contrast, the Cuban and Nicaraguan leaderships
understand from personal experience that inviting a
Russian military presence into the country threatens
the United States and could precipitate a forcible intervention against the regime. When the current Venezuelan leadership similarly invites Russian warships
and nuclear-capable aircraft to stage operations from
the country, they arguably do so without a historical
sense of the potential risks of such actions.
Such differences notwithstanding, the combination of both types of allies provide Russia with the opportunity to engage with the region in a sufficiently
provocative way so as to send a message to the United
States. As noted earlier, Russia’s open gambit in this
exchange was to deploy Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, and from there, to conduct flights in Caribbean
airspace to remind the United States that, with the
help of partners in the region, it could put nuclearcapable offensive military assets able to strike the
United States with little warning.21 The staging of Russian warships from Venezuela, and subsequently port
calls to Cuba and Nicaragua, reinforced this message,
while demonstrating the willingness of multiple nations of ALBA to participate in the implicit threat. For
similar reasons, Russian President Medvedev chose a
summit of ALBA leaders in Caracas, Venezuela, to receive him when he traveled to the region in November
2008.22
With respect to the third group, the three countries
with which Russia has had the most significant interactions have been Brazil, Peru, and Argentina. Although
the response of these countries to Russian advances
has not included explicit anti-U.S. political or military
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activity, the progress achieved is significant because
of the political, military, and economic weight in the
region of the countries involved.
Russian Engagement through Multilateral Forums.
As during the Cold War period, Russia has used
multilateral forums to compliment other vehicles for
its political and economic engagement with Latin
America. It has done so across a broad range of activities, from meetings of groups such as the G-7 (United
States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom
[UK], Italy, and Canada), G-20 (Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK, the United
States, and the European Union [EU]), and the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to anti-U.S. entities such as ALBA, and those exclusive of the United
States, such as the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American
and Caribbean States (CELAC). In general, Russia has
used different types of forums in different ways. It has
employed conventional forums such as the G-7, G-20,
and APEC as tools to participate on an “equal footing”
in the “club” of advanced nations, while it has used
forums such as ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC to send
symbolic messages to the United States and strengthen its ties with the region in a way that excludes the
United States.
In a similar fashion, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa) forum offered Russia an important opportunity to engage with not just
members of the alliance itself,23 but also with other
Latin American countries which came to the site of the
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summit. Forums such as the G-20 and APEC have afforded Russia multilateral engagement opportunities
with Latin American countries on Russian soil. The
September 2012 APEC summit, for example, was held
in Vladivostok, Russia, and the September 2013 G-20
meeting was held in St. Petersburg. Similarly, the next
BRICS summit in 2015 is to be held in Ufa, Russia,24
and the 2018 World Cup will be held in Russia as well.
Beyond such engagements, Russia has also sought
engagement with Latin American and Caribbean states
through the framework of explicitly Latin American
multilateral forums and sub-regional forums. Russia
has used Latin American venues exclusive of the United States to spearhead its re-engagement with the region. These include not only ALBA, but also CELAC,
whose foreign ministers met with their Russian counterpart in Havana, Cuba, in May 2013. At the end of
the meeting, Putin expressed a strong interest in developing a relationship.25 Russia has similarly indicated
interest in “substantive interactions” with UNASUR,
the Pacific Alliance, the Central American Integration
System (SICA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), notably ignoring a demonstration of interest in
the Organization of American States (OAS), in which
the United States and Canada are members.26
Military Interactions.
As during the Cold War with the Soviet Union,
military engagement has been a cornerstone of Russia’s reassertion of its presence in Latin America and
the Caribbean. Such engagement, although somewhat
more low key than it was during the Cold War, has
encompassed a full range of military activities, including expanded leadership visits, education and train-
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ing interactions, arms sales, and deployments to the
region. As noted earlier, Russia has reactivated and
built upon relationships with Soviet-era client states
of Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as leveraging countries which purchased Russian military goods during
the Cold War and which have maintained some ties
with the Russian armed forces. These countries include Peru, as mentioned previously, and to a lesser
extent, Brazil and Mexico.
With respect to arms sales and associated maintenance and training support, between 2001 and 2013,
Russia sold Latin America $14.5 billion in arms, representing approximately 40 percent of the $35.5 billion in arms purchased by the region from external
sources during the period.27 Of these purchases, approximately $11 billion went to Venezuela.28 Russian
arms are well represented at Latin American defense
expos such as FIDAE in Chile, Latin American Agribusiness Development (LAAD) Corporation in Brazil,
and SitDef in Peru.29
Russia’s most successful product in engaging with
the region has been its helicopters with over 400 Mi17 transport helicopters reportedly in service in the
region, accounting for 42 percent of its military helicopter fleet.30 Virtually all of the major countries in the
region have at least some Russian helicopters in their
inventory, including Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador,
Argentina, and Mexico. In many of these countries,
Russia has used its earlier success selling arms to the
region to win contracts in the contemporary period
for maintaining and repairing them. The experience
with Russian products and the simplification of maintenance, spare parts, and training by concentrating the
weapons inventory on a single country,31 decreased
the complexity of maintenance and training in prolif-
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erating supplier countries. This experience and simplification, as well as the personal relationships built
up over years of working with the Russian personnel,
have each played a role in helping Russian companies
secure such contracts.
Despite such successes, the Russian record in the
Latin American arms market has not been without
problems. Despite the previously mentioned success
of Rosoboronexport in selling $11 billion in arms to
Venezuela, 32 it saw those sales stall when Venezuela’s
Bolivarian Socialist government ran out of money in
a growing financial and political crisis. This allowed
Chinese arms companies to make significant inroads
in a market that had once been almost completely
dominated by the Russians.33
Although Russia has sold the country attack helicopters and air defense systems, the Brazilian market
has not lived up to the importance that Russia has put
on the country as a partner.34 Indeed, Russian arms
manufacturers have suffered multiple disappointments in Brazil, including the failure to sell the country the Russian Su-35 fighter or the Tigr light armored
vehicle, as well as the inability to win follow-on work
from the 2008 contract for Mi-35 attack helicopters beyond the 12 units in the original contract. On the other
hand, the BrahMos missile, one of the most significant
new weapons that could be introduced into the region
through sales to Brazil, is not entirely Russian, but
rather a collaborative effort with India.35
With respect to military activities beyond arms
sales, Russian deployments, institutional visits, and
other forms of military engagement with Latin America have increased and tapered off with the two previously mentioned cycles of heightened tensions with
the United States, in 2008 with the crisis in Georgia,
and in 2014 with escalating tensions in the Ukraine.
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During the Georgia crisis, as a short-term response
to the U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea, Russia
sent two supersonic, nuclear-capable Tu-160 backfire
bombers to Venezuela, and from there, to conduct
exercises in the Caribbean.36 Approximately 1 month
later (reflecting the time required to plan and execute
a trans-Atlantic naval movement), Russia sent a 4-ship
naval flotilla to Venezuela, including the cruiser Peter
the Great, the destroyer Admiral Chabanenko, a minesweeper, and a supply ship. These ships conducted
a naval exercise with their Venezuelan counterparts
before making port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua.37
In a manner parallel to its actions during the 2008
Georgia conflict, as U.S.-Russia tensions escalated
over the Ukraine in 2014, Russia bolstered a flurry of
diplomatic activity to the region by Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov and President Putin with declarations
regarding the establishment or reactivation of bases in
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.38 During the same
months, a Russian signals collection ship visited Cuba
multiple times.39
Despite the correlation between U.S.-Russian tensions and Russian military activity in Latin America,
a portion of expanding Russian military engagement
with the West has been independent from tensions
elsewhere. In March 2013, for example, following a
visit to Nicaragua by Russian Armed Forces Chief
of Staff Valery Gerasimov, Russia announced that it
was constructing a major new counterdrug center in
Managua, Nicaragua. The facility, officially addressing the very real problem of drug production in, and
shipment across, the region, would be used to train
not only Nicaraguans, but also law enforcement personnel from an array of other countries in the region,
giving Russia important security engagement opportunities with those nations.40
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Similarly, a three-ship Russian flotilla traveled to
the region in August 2013, making port calls in both
Cuba and Nicaragua.41 In February 2014, as the crisis
in the Ukraine escalated, Commander in Chief of U.S.
Southern Command General John Kelly commented
that Russia’s new military presence in the region was
greater than anything seen in 3 decades.42
Commercial Focus of Re-Engagement.
By comparison with other extra-hemispheric actors
in the region such as the PRC, Russia’s commercial engagement has been more limited in its overall volume
and in its concentration on a number of countries and
sectors. In 2013, Russia’s bilateral trade with Latin
America and the Caribbean was $18.8 billion, representing less than 1 percent of the $2.35 trillion in trade
between the states of the region and the rest of the
world. This was 14 times less than China’s $257.9 billion in trade with Latin America and the Caribbean.43
Even as Russia expands its bilateral trade with the
region, it continues to fall further behind China, the
current star in interregional trade. Although Russia’s
trade with the region has expanded almost six-fold
from the $3.3 billion that it traded with the region in
2003, China’s trade with the region increased almost
10-fold during the same period.44
Russia’s commercial relationship with Latin America is dominated by its engagement with Brazil and
Mexico, which together represent 50 percent of Russian trade with the region. Other significant partners
there, in declining order, include Argentina, Ecuador,
Panama, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, and
Nicaragua. The composition of trade between Russia and each of its partners also varies significantly.
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For example, Russia both imports products from and
exports products to Brazil, by contrast to Venezuela,
for which only $10 million (less than .3 percent) of its
$3.42 billion in trade was from exports to Russia. Similarly, Mexico and Peru run significant trade deficits
with Russia, while for most of the rest, Russia imports
more from these countries than it exports to them.45
With respect to the sectorial composition of Russian trade with Latin America, the latter has been
particularly concentrated in petroleum, mining, arms
sales, and niche technologies such as nuclear energy.
In the petroleum and mining sectors, Russian firms
have made investments in a number of Latin American countries, including oilfields in Venezuela and
bauxite mines in Jamaica and Guyana, among others.
Russian firms such as Inter Rao and Power Machines
have bid for, and supplied, components for the construction of hydroelectric and thermoelectric facilities,
while Rosatom has positioned itself to build civilian
nuclear reactors in Brazil and Argentina, and less realistically, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay. Russia has
also been a significant buyer of Latin American agricultural goods, and in recent years, the country has
demonstrated an expanded interest in Latin America
as a tourist destination, with a focus on Cuba, Jamaica,
and other islands of the Caribbean.
In general, Russian banks have not played as significant a role in advancing its projects in Latin America
in the way that Chinese financing has underwritten its
construction and infrastructure projects in the ALBA
states and the Caribbean, with Chinese policy banks
loaning more than $100 billion to the region between
2005 and 2013.46 Nonetheless, Russia has provided
money to select Latin American countries, including
$4 billion through the Russia-Venezuela joint bank
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in 2012 and 2013 to make possible Venezuela’s purchase of Russian arms.47 Similarly, the Russian policy
bank Vnesheconombank has offered financial backing for Russian hydroelectric projects in Ecuador and
Argentina.
With respect to multilateral lending, in July 2014
at the BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, Russia, like
other BRICS members, offered to put up $10 billion
in seed capital for the establishment of a new “BRICS
bank.”48 Russia has also indicated an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank, and has
signed cooperation agreements with the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) and the Latin American
Association of Development Financing Institutions,49
yet to date, such proposals have not borne fruit.
With respect to Russia as a market and source of
investment for Latin America and the Caribbean, the
mediocre performance of the Russian economy and
the nation’s limited commercial interactions with the
region have not inspired the same level of enthusiasm
among the region’s political leaders and businessmen
that China has inspired there. Although Russia has
a reservoir of goodwill with certain Latin American
and Caribbean countries, particularly among its Cold
War allies and the members of ALBA, Latin American
students are not clamoring to learn Russian, nor are
businessmen hurrying to establish themselves in the
Russian domestic market.
Ethnic Russians in Latin America.
In interacting with the states of Latin America and
the Caribbean, Russia has a relatively limited diaspora of its ethnic nationals living there. Most of Latin
America’s Russian population immigrated from the
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end of the 19th century through the early-20th century, fleeing economic hardship and later the violence
and chaos of the 1917 Russian Revolution.
Between the formation of the Soviet Union and its
collapse in 1989, a smaller group of Russians migrated
to the region, including some who came to countries
such as Cuba to fight for the revolutionary cause.
The largest Russian immigrant population in Latin
America and the Caribbean is found today in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil,50 although small numbers
of Russians are found throughout the region.51 They
have not, however, played a highly visible role in contemporary Russian re-engagement with the region,
either in economic or political terms.
Intellectual Infrastructure.
By contrast to the PRC, Russia’s re-engagement
with Latin America that started in 2008 was able to
leverage a relatively well-developed pool of academic
knowledge regarding the region, as well as a substantial group of persons with the language skills to operate there, thanks to the legacy of Soviet engagement
there during the Cold War. This includes the previously noted sending of advisors and others to Cuba
and Nicaragua, the nurturing of relationships with
guerilla movements in states such as El Salvador and
Guatemala, and ongoing ties to the states of the region, as well as out-of-power leftist parties and movements. As Sovietologist Cole Blasier put it in 1987, the
Soviet Union established a presence in the Western
Hemisphere “unique in history.”52
As noted earlier, the intellectual infrastructure in
Russia for understanding Latin America began to increase in 1959 with the Cuban revolution and the op-
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portunities that it highlighted for the Soviet Union to
expand its political and military position in the region.
While Russian engagement itself fell off somewhat
with the retrenchment of Russia at the end of the Cold
War, the nation’s key Latin America centers today are
able to leverage to some degree the body of knowledge built up by Latin Americanists from that era:
1. the Institute of Latin America, Moscow,
2. the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow,
3. the Latin America research center at Moscow
State University, and
4. the Center for the Study of Latin America, part
of St. Petersburg State University.
Of these, the oldest, largest, and most prestigious is
arguably the Institute of Latin America, established by
the Soviet government in 1961. At its height in the late1980s, this institute included 100 full-time researchers
and provided support for others in other institutions
throughout the country.53
Interactions with Other Extra-regional Actors.
Another important consideration for Russia as
it has expanded its engagement in Latin America is
competition from, and complementarity with, the
commercial and governmental entities of other extrahemispheric actors also operating in the region. In
political, military, commercial, and other affairs, those
interactions have featured a complex mixture of competition and complementarity. In forums such as the
BRICS, for example, Russia has presented a united
front with states from outside the hemisphere such
as China and India against established “developed
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nations” in the region. In military affairs, as noted
previously, Russia has cooperated with India to develop the hypersonic BrahMos missile,54 marketed to
Latin American countries including Brazil, Chile, and
Venezuela.55
At the same time, Russia also competes with other
extra-hemispheric actors for the Latin America defense market. Examples include a 2012 bid for an air
defense systems contract in Peru, in which Russian
and Chinese companies went head-to-head. In Venezuela, Russian arms sales have been to some degree
displaced by sales to Chinese companies, beginning
with a $500 million contract in July 2012 to the Chinese
arms company NORINCO. The contract included purchase of armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, and other
advanced equipment once supplied almost solely by
Russian companies to the Venezuelan market.56
With respect to commerce, Russian, Chinese, and
Indian companies have competed for oil blocks and
mining concessions in Venezuela, Ecuador, and other
countries of the region. In Argentina, for example,
Russian and Chinese companies have been rivals in
the energy sector for hydroelectric projects such as the
Nestor Kirchner and Jorge Copernic facilities on Argentina’s Santa Cruz River, as well as for the construction of new nuclear facilities.57
RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN
AMERICA COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY
The following section of this monograph analyzes
Russian activities in Latin America and the Caribbean
on a country-by-country basis, with an emphasis on
political and military engagement, as well as Russian
commercial projects in the region in sectors such as
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petroleum, mining, energy infrastructure, and to
a lesser extent, trade. While this section attempts to
cover the most significant country relationships,
commercial ventures, and interactions, it does not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of all countries or
Russian activities in the region.
Mexico.
The current Mexico-Russia relationship is relatively modest, although during the Cold War, the Soviet Union courted left-of-center Mexican Presidents
like Luis Echeverría, who, in 1973, became the first
Latin American leader to visit the Soviet Union. Reciprocally in 2004, Russian President Putin traveled to
Mexico for a state visit, meeting with his counterpart,
Vicente Fox. In 2005, Fox reciprocated by making a
state visit to Russia, and the two met again in the G-8
(United States, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy,
Canada, and Russia) + G-5 (United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK) meeting in St. Petersburg
in 2006.58 As a legacy of Mexico’s independent posture
in the Americas, that country has traditionally maintained some military interactions with Russia.
In the domain of arms sales, the Mexican navy has
purchased Russian BTR-60 and Ural-4320 armored
vehicles, 52 of which remain in service,59 as well as
9K38 Igla anti-aircraft missiles. Russia has also sold to
Mexico 24 Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters, acquired between
1996 and 1999, as well as 12 Mi-8T Hip-C transport
helicopters and two Antonov An-124 heavy transport
aircraft.60 As with Russian military engagements in
other Latin American countries, such sales have created opportunities for interactions for the maintenance
of, and modifications to, the equipment. Beginning in
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May 2014, Mexico begun to send its aging Mi-17s and
Mi-8Ts helicopters to Russia for upgrades, even as it
replaced another part of the same military transport
fleet with European Airbus Super Puma helicopters.61
Security interactions have also extended beyond arms
sales to Russian assistance in the struggle against organized crime, with an agreement signed between the
two governments on the topic in 2010.62
In addition to military actions, Russia also engages
with Mexico in the commercial sphere to a greater degree than is commonly recognized. In 2013, Mexico
was Russia’s 6th largest trading partner in the region,
although almost the entire relationship ($827 million
out of $849 billion in bilateral trade) was Mexican purchases of Russian products.63 Mexico’s exports to Russia also include a relatively large quantity of manufactured goods. Indeed, 55 percent of Mexican exports to
Russia in 2013 were motorized vehicles (cars, trucks,
motorcycles, etc.), although another 12 percent was
alcohol and other beverages. For Russia, half of the
nation’s exports to Mexico in 2013 were iron and steel,
with another 21 percent being fertilizers, and another
18 percent being mineral fuels and oils.64
With respect to specific Russian investments in
Mexico, Russian oil companies have expressed interest in the nation’s petroleum sector, seeking to capitalize on opportunities for participation for foreign nationals created by reforms to the sector. The first major
foray by a Russian firm into the sector was the Russian firm Lukoil, which signed an agreement with the
Mexican state oil company Pemex in February 2014 to
cooperate in oil exploration and the supply of oil technology.65 As in other Latin American countries, the
Russian atomic energy agency Rosatom has signed an
agreement with the Mexican government to assist in
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the development of civilian nuclear power,66 although
the agreement has not yet produced a significant
commercial initiative.
In aviation, the Mexican commercial airline Interjet has purchased $650 million in Superjet-100 planes
from Russia’s Sukhoi.67 Russia has also sought to facilitate tourism and other travel with Mexico, with
the two countries establishing direct flights between
Moscow and Cancun.68 In general, the focus of Russian tourism in Mexico has been the state of Quintana
Roo, the location of Cancun and the Caribbean beach
resorts of Riviera Maya, with an estimated 30,000
Russians visiting the state in 2011 alone.69
Despite its close relations to the United States,
Mexico’s interest in exporting goods to Russia has positioned it to benefit from Russia’s dispute with the
United States and Europe over the Ukraine. As with
other countries such as Argentina and Brazil, when
Russia suspended purchases of agricultural goods
from the United States and Europe,70 the Mexican
government repeatedly sought to facilitate opportunities for Mexican companies to increase agricultural exports to Russia,71 but found little interest among them
in doing so.72
Nicaragua.
During the Cold War, Russian and Cuban assistance helped bring the FSLN and its leader Ortega to
power,73 and help the government to survive the challenge posed by the contra insurgency. Nonetheless,
the relationship atrophied following Russia’s withdraw from the region in 1989 and the loss of power
by the Sandinistas in the February 1990 Nicaraguan
national election.
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The renovation of close relations between Russia
and Nicaragua that began in 2008 was triggered by
a coincidence of imperatives and enabling conditions
on both the Nicaraguan and Russian sides. In January
2007, former Nicaraguan President and revolutionary
Ortega returned to power after prevailing in a complex presidential election in which both his Sandinista movement and the more conservative opposition
were split. If Ortega was looking for an opportunity to
show his Russian allies that Nicaragua could still be
useful to Moscow in the post-Cold War era, such an
opportunity presented itself in September 2008 during the civil war in Georgia, when Ortega’s government became the first in Latin America to recognize
diplomatically the pro-Russian breakaway republics
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In the context of the same conflict, in the final
months of 2008, Russia reached out to receptive states
in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to conduct political and military activities in close proximity to the United States. This action was intended to
send a symbolic warning to the United States that
Russia was capable of acting in the U.S. “backyard,”
in response to what it interpreted as U.S. meddling
in its own sphere of interest. Nicaragua was one of
the states, along with Venezuela and Cuba, which
agreed to host some of the most provocative aspects
of the Russian demonstration. Specifically, Nicaragua
received two Russian nuclear-capable, supersonic
Tu-160 bombers sent by Russia to conduct flights in
the Caribbean. A month later, in December, it similarly hosted a visiting flotilla of Russian warships led
by the cruiser Peter the Great.74
Following the incidents of 2008, Nicaragua continued to play a key role in Russian military engage-
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ment with the region. In April 2013, Chief of Staff of
the Russian Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov
traveled to Nicaragua to preside over the opening of a
munitions disposal facility in the country, and to discuss military cooperation between the two countries.75
While there, he also showcased a new military training center which Moscow was constructing in Managua, the “Marshall Zukhov” military counternarcotics
training center, also in Managua,76 building upon a
counternarcotics cooperation agreement signed between the two nations in March 2013.77 Through the
new center, Russia is potentially able to interact not
only with Nicaraguan law enforcement officers, but
also those from other Central American countries,
as well as Ecuador and the Dominican Republic,
among others.
In September 2013, two Russian warships made
a port call in the Nicaraguan Pacific-Coast port of
Corinto, after visiting Cuba and passing through the
Panama Canal.78 At the end of October of 2013, Nicaragua was visited by a Russian delegation headed
by the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security
Council (and former head of the Russian intelligence
service) Nikolai Patrushev,79 resulting in the signing
of an agreement for Russian support in the modernization of Nicaragua’s armed forces.80 Also emerging
from the Patrushev visit was an agreement facilitating
high-level consultations between the High Command
of Nicaragua and Russia’s Security Council, advancing the level of strategic cooperation between the two
countries.81
In conjunction with the Patrushev visit, in a manner paralleling events of September 2008, two Russian
Tu-160s, made a trip to the region, first flying from
Russia to Venezuela, before conducting aerial maneu-
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vers in the Caribbean and landing in Nicaragua. While
on return from Nicaragua to Venezuela, the bombers
caused an international incident when they made unauthorized incursions into Colombian airspace in the
proximity of the Colombian island of San Andres and
the surrounding cays.82 This act that was seen by some
in Colombia as a message of Russia’s support to Nicaragua’s claim to the waters surrounding the islands,
and perhaps the islands and cays themselves.83 The
coincidence of the incursion with the visit of Patrushev (considered a hard-liner), raised the possibility
that the incursion was a signal sent to Colombia following coordination between Patrushev and Ortega,
although no concrete evidence substantiating such a
connection has emerged.
Later in October (possibly also linked to the Patrushev visit), President Ortega requested, and the
Sandinista-dominated Nicaraguan parliament passed,
a resolution authorizing visits to Nicaragua by Russian warships, military aircraft and ground forces, as
well as authorizing Russian forces to conduct patrols
off of Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast near the Colombian island of San Andres and surrounding cays,84 although as of the date of this writing, the Russians had
not done so. Russia-Nicaragua military interactions
and announcements of future cooperation continued
to expand throughout 2014 as tensions between the
United States and Russia increased over the conflict
in the Ukraine. In February 2014, as noted previously,
Nicaragua was one of three Latin American countries
mentioned by Russian Defense Minister Shoigu as
candidates for establishing new Russian maintenance
bases in the Caribbean.85 In June 2014, Russia opened
a maintenance facility for military vehicles in Nicaragua in support of that nation’s mechanized brigade,
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further allowing Russia to expand its military
presence there.86
In general, Russia-Nicaragua military cooperation
has paralleled other aspects of the re-engagement between the two countries that began in 2008. In 2013,
the two countries signed an agreement regarding Russian support for the modernization of the Nicaraguan
armed forces.87 Pursuant to that agreement, new Russian military equipment has begun to appear in Nicaragua, including two Mi-17 aircraft,88 BMP-1 armored
personnel carriers, BM-21 mobile rocket launchers,
PT-76 light armored vehicles, and announced negotiations for Mig-29 fighter aircraft.89 Russia has further donated equipment to the Nicaraguan military,
including $500,000 in first aid equipment donated
in January 2014,90 and has discussed selling Nicaragua Russian patrol boats and the Tigr light armored
vehicle.91
Russia military-to-military engagement also has
included sending Nicaraguan personnel to Russian
institutions for training,92 as well as conducting joint
counternarcotics operations on Nicaraguan soil. In
March 2013, for example, a joint Russia-Nicaragua
operation against a local drug gang resulted in the arrest of 41 persons and the seizure of 10 “containers” of
cocaine.93
With respect to Russia-Nicaragua commercial activities, by contrast to the significant amount of military cooperation between the two countries since 2008,
trade between the two has been a modest $522 million,
with all but $18 million of that Nicaraguan imports of
Russian products.94 Of Nicaraguan exports to Russia
in 2013, 95 percent were comprised of three products:
oilseeds, coffee, and meat, in that order. Similarly, 80
percent of Russia’s exports to Nicaragua during the
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period were cereals, with an additional 9 percent being
fertilizers.95 Specific commercial transactions between
Russia-Nicaragua are dominated by the donation of
goods, or their purchase by the Nicaraguan state with
concessional loans, followed by their resale within the
country. Key examples of such transactions since 2008
include Russia’s gift of 520 buses, 500 Lada-brand cars
and trucks,96 and 100,000 tons of wheat, as well as the
construction of a $41 million hospital.97
The largest project in which Russia has considered
participating in Nicaragua is the canal connecting the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the country. Possible Russian support for the canal, long desired in Nicaragua,
was a key discussion topic in Ortega’s trip to Moscow
in 2008,98 although the countries did not proceed forward with the project at that time.99 In 2012, the initiative shifted to an even more ambitious $40-$80 billion
canal project spearheaded by Chinese businessman
Wang Jing and his company Hong Kong Nicaragua
Development (HKND). Yet, despite the media attention given to the possibility of a leading role by the
Chinese government and banks in the project, Russia
also continues to pursue an interest in participating in
some fashion. When Russian President Putin made an
unscheduled stop in Managua as part of his July 2014
trip to Latin America, analysts speculated that Russian participation in the canal project was part of the
agenda.100 In a follow-up visit by a Russian delegation
in September 2014, the Nicaraguan civil defense authority announced that Russia would provide equipment to be used in the construction of the canal.101
Guatemala.
Within Central America, Guatemala is an outlier as
a Central American state which has maintained some
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economic and diplomatic ties with Russia despite a
legacy of unsuccessful attempts by Marxist guerillas to
overthrow its conservative government.102 Although
Guatemala technically established relations with the
Soviet Union in 1945, political and other engagement
between the two countries remained limited during
Guatemala’s 30-year long civil war from 1960 through
1990, in which Russia was seen to back the insurgents
seeking to overthrow the Guatemalan government.103
Even after the peace accords of 1996, which put an end
to the Guatemalan civil war, the country conducted
diplomatic relations with Russia through Costa Rica
until 2007, when Russia established an embassy in
Guatemala City. In March 2010, Alvaro Colom became the first Guatemalan president to visit Russia.104
The trip, however, occurred near the end of his term,
and Colom’s successor, General Otto Perez Molina,
has not shown a similar interest in diplomatic engagement with the country.
With respect to economic interactions, Russian
companies have had a small presence in Guatemala’s
mining and petroleum sectors. In 2011, for example,
the Russian firm Solway purchased the Fenix ferronickel mine near the town of El Estor.105 The resulting entity Compania Guatemalteca de Niquel has subsequently invested $450 million dollars in the sector.106
In petroleum, in July 2013, the Russian-backed Panamanian company Zacapa was granted a concession
by the Guatemalan Ministry of Energy and Mines to
explore for gas and oil.107
Venezuela.
Venezuela, alongside Nicaragua and Cuba, has
arguably been one of Russia’s cornerstones for the
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re-engagement that it has pursued with the region
since 2008. Although Venezuela lacks the legacy of
intergovernmental collaboration with Russia during
the Cold War that mark Cuba and Nicaragua’s relationship with Russia, Venezuela has partially compensated for that through its willingness to support
Russian initiatives in the region, the magnitude of its
arms purchases from Russia, and the significance of
its oil reserves, in which Russian firms have shown a
strong interest.
The story of Venezuela’s contemporary engagement with Russia began in 2006, with a focus on arms
purchases. The Venezuelan regime of former military
officer Hugo Chavez turned to Russia to buy arms
when the U.S. refused to sell the nation spare parts for
its F-16s fighter aircraft. Venezuela was motivated to
turn away from Western arms suppliers almost entirely when the United States successfully prevented European arms manufacturers from selling their product
to the country, based on agreements that those manufacturers had signed in order to incorporate U.S. technology in their own weapons. These sales108 became
the initial lynchpin of Venezuela-Russia cooperation,
allowing Venezuelan leader Chavez to simultaneously defy U.S. attempts to deny him arms, while keeping
his supporters within the Venezuelan military happy.
Against this backdrop, when U.S.-Russia tensions
escalated in 2008 over the crisis in Georgia, Chavez
was willing to make Venezuela available to Russia
as a platform through which the latter could engage
diplomatically with, and project, military forces to the
region in order to send the United States a warning
and potentially distract it from engaging in Georgia
by putting the United States strategically at risk in its
own “backyard.”
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As noted previously, Nicaragua recognized the
pro-Russian breakaway republics of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and Venezuela was the lead actor to
receive Russia’s nuclear-capable Tu-160 supersonic
bombers when they deployed to the Western Hemisphere in September 2008 amidst the escalating conflict. Similarly, 2 1/2 months later, Venezuela was the
first country in the region to receive the four-ship flotilla of Russian warships led by the cruiser Peter the
Great. Naval exercises were conducted with the ships
before they moved on to visit Nicaragua and Cuba. In
each case, the Chavez regime showed that it was willing to go beyond provocative anti-Western rhetoric
to host Russian military forces that the United States
might have perceived as menacing, with the risk of
provoking military action from the United States.
Despite Venezuela’s enthusiasm to receive Russian
military assets, the Russians, for their part, were careful to ensure that, in sending a message to the United
States through their actions, they were not perceived
as excessively provocative. Prior to the arrival of the
Tu-160s, for example, Russia publicly announced that
they were not carrying nuclear weapons.109 Moreover,
when the naval flotilla arrived in Venezuela, Russia
cut short the scheduled 3-day exercise between the
ships and the Venezuelan navy, and denied a request
by Venezuelan President Chavez to visit the lead
Russian ship.110
Following the departure of the Russian naval flotilla, the Chavez regime continued to remind the United States of its willingness to offer itself as a host for
Russian military and other activities in the Americas.
In March 2009, for example, Chavez announced that
he would allow Russia to use Venezuelan terrain to
base strategic bombers, presumably for use against
the United States. Yet, the island that he publicly men33

tioned for basing the aircraft, La Orchilla,111 was far
too small to permit the take-off of the Russian aircraft
in question, even if a runway was built from one tip
of the island to the other. This suggested that the announcement had been more a message to provoke the
United States than a serious initiative.
Such Venezuelan openness to military collaboration with Russia has continued to the present day.
When Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu announced
in February 2014 that Russia would establish permanent facilities in the region to receive and resupply its
military forces, it included Venezuela as one of the
three Latin American regimes to serve as a possible
host, along with Cuba and Nicaragua.112
Venezuela’s purchases of Russian arms, mentioned
previously as the launch point of the contemporary
close Venezuela-Russia relationship, has served as a
compliment to its willingness to host Russian military
forces. From 2001 through 2013, Russia sold Venezuela over $11 billion in military goods,113 making the
country by far the principal purchaser of Russian
arms in the Western Hemisphere, accounting for over
two-thirds of the $14.5 billion in sales to the region by
the Russian arms supplier Rosoboronexport.114 Russia’s arms sales between 2006 and 2014 may be loosely divided into three groups of purchases. The first
group of sales, with a value of approximately $4 billion, was focused on helicopters, fighter aircraft, and
small arms. Venezuela purchased 53 helicopters from
Russia, including 38 Mi-17V-5s, 10 Mi-35M2 attack
helicopters, and three Mi-26T2 heavy transports.115 Indeed, the quantity of Russian helicopters sold to Venezuela was so great that in 2011, the Russian company
Transas announced that it was setting up a regional
center for helicopter instruction there.116 In addition to
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helicopters, the first group of Venezuelan purchases
also included 24 Su-30 fighter aircraft and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, as well as Russian assistance in building a factory in the country to assemble them.117
The second group of Russian arms sales to Venezuela, whose negotiation and delivery spanned the
period from roughly 2008 through 2011, included 12
Tor-M1 self-propelled air defense systems, Zu-23 antiaircraft guns, 12 9K58 Smerch multiple rocket systems,
2S23 120 millimeter (mm) self-propelled mortars, IglaS man-portable surface-to-air missiles,118 and T-72B1V
tanks, of which Venezuela eventually purchased
192.119 Other Russian systems acquired by Venezuela
during this period also included BMP-3 and BTR-8A
armored personnel carriers,120 Bal-E mobile coastal
defense missile systems, Buk-2ME and S-300VM Antey-2500 mobile anti-aircraft missile systems.121
The third group of sales, which were negotiated
as Chavez’ health deteriorated in 2012, was only partially realized due to deepening economic problems
in Venezuela. This group included Russian fast attack
boats, submarines, and Yak-130 fighters to replace
Venezuela’s aging F-5s,122 as well as 10 Mi-28 NG
Night Hunter attack helicopters.123 Agreements for
even more arms purchases were signed in May 2014,
between the commander in chief of the Venezuelan
armed forces Carmen Meléndez Rivas, and the Vicepresident of the Russian Federal Military Technical
Cooperation Service, Andrei Boltsov, on the occasion
of the 10th Ruso-Venezuelan High-Level Intergovernmental Commission.124
With respect to the Russia-Venezuela commercial
engagement, Venezuela is Russia’s second largest
trade partner in the region behind Brazil, yet the relationship is extremely imbalanced. In 2013, for example,
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all but $10 million of the $3.42 billion in Russia-Venezuela bilateral trade was Venezuelan purchases from
Russia.125 With respect to the composition of Russian
exports to Venezuela, according to the United Nations (UN) COMTRADE database, in 2013, 92 percent
of those exports were accounted for by three types of
goods: 59 percent of the total were arms, 26 percent
were vehicles (cars, trucks, and motorcycles), and 7
percent were electrical and electronic equipment.126
With respect to specific nonmilitary projects in
Venezuela, Russian companies have leveraged the
favorable political relationship between the two countries to build a significant presence in Venezuela’s oil
sector, although Russian companies operating there
have experienced numerous difficulties. In 2009, a
five-company Russian consortium committed to an
investment of $16.2 billion to develop the Junin-6 oil
block in the newly nationalized Orinoco tar sands,
with the resulting Russia-PdVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company) venture operation named “Petromiranda.”127 The deal included payment of a $600 million
signing bonus to PdVSA.128 In addition, the Russian
oil company Rosneft (part of the Junin-6 consortium)
subsequently contracted with PdVSA for rights to the
Carabobo 2 block, making a royalty payment of $1 billion for those rights,129 while the Russian firm Lukoil
contracted for the Junin-3 block.130
As with other multinational firms, the Russian
companies in the Venezuelan oil sector experienced
delays in working with their Venezuelan partners to
invest and bring production on line.131 Due to such
frustrations, in January 2013, the Russian firm Surgutneftegaz pulled out of the Junin-6 consortium,
selling its stake to Rosneft.132 In October 2013, Lukoil
similarly announced that it was withdrawing from the
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country.133 As other Russian companies have pulled
out of oil operations in the Orinoco tar belt, Russian
petroleum activities in Venezuela have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Russian
firm Rosneft, headed by Igor Sechin, a former Soviet-era intelligence operative close to Putin. Sechin’s
long-term interest and expanding stake in the Venezuela petroleum sector was illustrated in 2014 when
he sponsored the construction of a statue dedicated
to Chavez, in the late Venezuelan leader’s home town
of Sabaneta, and traveled to the town to dedicate it
personally.134 Indeed, in July 2014, the consolidation
of Russian oil activities in Venezuela in the hands of
Rosneft continued with the company’s purchase of the
Venezuelan assets of Weatherford International.135
In addition to petroleum, Russia also has a modest presence in Venezuela’s mining sector, although,
there, as in the petroleum sector, its companies have
experienced difficulties. In January 2009, the Russian
mining company Rusoro formed joint venture concessions with the Venezuelan government to develop the
Las Cristinas and Brisas minerals fields. The award
took by surprise the Canadian firm Crystallex, which
had applied for permits to develop the properties.136
Yet Rusoro did not fare much better in dealing with
the Chavez regime than had Crystallex, and by August
2012, Rusoro had become embroiled in a legal dispute
with the regime over its Venezuela operations.137
Nor have Russian projects in Venezuela been limited to arms, petroleum, and mining. Russia has reportedly discussed a joint venture with the Venezuelan
government to construct a shipyard.138
In the financial sector, in 2009, Russia and Venezuela announced a joint-capital bank to fund projects
in the country,139 with $4 billion in initial funds.140 Its
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principal focus, to date, has been underwriting the
sale of Russian arms to the country,141 with loans of $2
billion in 2012 and $2 billion in 2013 to support such
transactions.142
Cuba.
From 1959, when Fidel Castro and his supporters
overthrew the Batista government and took power in
Havana, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Cuba served as Russia’s principal partner for engaging with, and advancing, its strategic position in the
region. When Moscow sought to rebuild its relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean prior to
its high-profile political and military moves in 2008,
it began with a low-key attempt to repair its relations
with Cuba.
During the Cold War period, Russia was Cuba’s
principal patron and ally, as well as its main collaborator for advancing anti-U.S. revolutionary movements in the third world, including Latin America, the
Caribbean, and Africa. For Russia, in the form of the
Soviet Union, post-Revolution Cuba was the principal
gateway in Latin America and the Caribbean for activities with state partners, insurgents, and other groups
to advance global communism and the strategic position of the Soviet Union.143 Russia reciprocated the
favor, providing not only billions of dollars in arms,
loans, and aid to Cuba, but also hosting tens of thousands of Cubans to travel to Russia for education in its
universities.144
During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union
also maintained its most important overseas signals
collection facility at Lourdes, Cuba,145 housing an
estimated 3,000 Soviet intelligence specialists. With
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respect to military support, between 1961 and 1991,
Russia provided Cuba with an estimated $16 billion
in arms, including T-55 and T-62 tanks; anti-aircraft
defenses; MiG-29, MiG-23, and MiG-21 fighters; Mi24, Mi-17, Mi-8, and Mi-14 helicopters, among other
equipment.146
Russia’s withdrawal from the region in 1989 created significant financial hardship for Cuba for which
it was able to compensate only partly through help
from the PRC. Nonetheless, Russia’s withdraw left
lingering resentment within the Cuban leadership.147
With the election of Putin to the Russian Presidency,
the country began cautiously to rebuild its ties with
Cuba. Putin visited the country in December 2000, and
in September 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov
made a visit to the country.148 Reciprocally, in December 2006, Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque
visited Russia.149
When Russia began the current stage of its reengagement with Latin America in 2008, it featured
Cuba prominently in its outreach, alongside of Nicaragua and Venezuela, as noted previously. Russian President Medvedev made a point to visit Cuba,
although only for 1 day, during his November 2008
Latin America trip and met with both President Raul
Castro and his brother, Fidel.150 Raul Castro reciprocated with a trip to Russia 2 months later, in January
2009, 22 years after the last visit by a Cuban president
to the country, that of his brother, Fidel.151
Despite such activity, Cuba’s embrace of Russia’s
re-engagement with the region in 2008 was subtly
less enthusiastic than that by Venezuela and Nicaragua, arguably reflecting lingering resentment over
the economic hardship caused by Russia’s precipitous withdraw from the region in 1991. By contrast to
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Venezuela and Nicaragua, Cuba did not follow Russia
and diplomatically recognize the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 when they broke
away from Georgia.152 Similarly, it was Venezuela,
rather than Cuba, that initially hosted the two Russian
Tu-160 bombers when they deployed to the region in
September 2008. Nor did Cuba participate in the naval exercise which Venezuela and Russia conducted
in the Caribbean, although the flotilla did make a port
call in the Port of Havana, Cuba, following conclusion
of the exercise.153
As Russian re-engagement with the region continued in the years which followed, Cuba continued to
play an important role. Following his departure from
the Russian presidency in May 2012, Medvedev paid a
new visit to Cuba in February 2013, this time as Prime
Minister. When Putin traveled to the region in 2014 in
the context of the escalating crisis in the Ukraine, he
made Cuba the first stop on his trip.154
With respect to military cooperation, since 2008,
Cuba has consistently been included in virtually all
Russian deployments to the region, although typically
with Venezuela playing the leading role. Because of its
proximity to the United States, Cuba has also repeatedly played a role as host for the real and proposed
positioning of Russian military assets in the region, as
well as being the recipient of modest quantities of new
Russian arms and military-to-military personnel and
training interactions.
Beyond such temporary deployments and with
Cuba’s proximity to the United States, the nation may
be resuming its Cold War role as host for Russian collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) against the
United States. In February 2014, as the crisis in the
Ukraine escalated, the Vishnya-class Russian SIGINT
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ship Viktor Leonov (SSV-175) conducted operations in
the Caribbean, then made a port call in Havana harbor.155 With respect to land-based SIGINT facilities, in
July 2014, Russia indicated that it would re-activate
and send personnel to the facility at Lourdes, Cuba,
just 155 miles from the United States, which it used to
monitor the United States during the Cold War.156
Beyond intelligence collection, Cuba has also been
mentioned by Russia as a candidate for the servicing,
or even basing, of offensive military assets. In March
2009, Chief of Staff of Russia’s long range aviation Major General Anatoly Zhikharev captured the attention
of the international press when he spoke publicly of
the possibility of using Cuba (in addition to Venezuela), as a base for Russian military aircraft. Russian
defense officials quickly qualified his remarks, saying
that the General had been speaking only hypothetically.157 Although Zhikharev’s comments were not followed up by concrete action, the theme re-emerged in
February 2014, when Shoigu indicated that Cuba was
one of three Latin American countries (the other two
being Venezuela and Nicaragua) in which Russia was
considering facilities to receive and resupply its warships and other military assets.158
With respect to post-2008 arms sales, Moscow is
helping Cuba to maintain and upgrade its legacy Cold
War era Russian military equipment. In 2011, for example, Russia built an assembly line for the production of 7.62-mm rounds for Kalashnikov rifles at the
Che Guevara weapons factory in the eastern part of
the country, after having constructed a similar facility in Venezuela.159 The nation has also resumed gifts
and sales of arms on credit to Cuba. In April 2013,
for example, Gerasimov visited the country and announced that Russia would give Cuba a $650 million
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credit for the purchase of eight military aircraft: two
Tupolev Tu-204s, three Antonov An-158s, and three
Ilushyn-96-400 aircraft.160 In December 2013, Russia
announced that it was restructuring Cuba’s $35 billion
Cold War debt,161 with Russian President Putin finalizing the write-off of all but $3.5 billion during his July
2014 visit to Havana.162
Russia and Cuba are also collaborating in various
strategic technology areas. For a number of years, Russia and Cuba have collaborated in the area of medical
research,163 including biotechnology.164 During Putin’s
July 2014 visit to the region, Cuba also agreed to host
ground facilities for the Russian GLONASS (Global
Navigation Satellite System), which competes with
the U.S.-based global positioning system (GPS).165
With respect to other types of commercial cooperation, Cuba-Russia ties have been more modest than
suggested by the history of close military and political
cooperation between the two countries. Russia-Cuba
trade was almost $179 million in 2013, ranking it 15th
among Russia’s trading partners in Latin America,
and less than a 10th of Cuba’s $1.88 billion in trade
with China.166 Of the Russia-Cuba trade, all but $32
billion were Cuban imports of products from Russia.167 According to the UN COMTRADE database,
27 percent of those Russian exports to Cuba in 2013
was equipment for nuclear reactors, 24 percent was
vehicles (cars, trucks, buses, and motorcycles), and 11
percent was railway equipment, followed by rubber
goods and electrical machinery.168 At the individual
firm level, Russian companies are present in the Cuban gas and oil sector, the electricity sector, logistics
and construction, the Cuban nickel industry, sugar
refining, and tourism among others. Cuba also hosts
Russian-Cuban and Cuban-Russian business councils.
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During 2008 to 2014, Russia expanded its presence
in the Cuban petroleum sector, with the Russian firms
Gazprom and Rosneft drilling for oil in the Gulf of
Mexico.169 The Russian firm Zarubezhneft is also present, drilling in the Boca de Jaruco oilfield in cooperation with Cuba’s state oil company Cupet.170
With respect to other infrastructure projects, Russia has also agreed to fund the construction of four
200 megawatt power stations to boost capability at
the Cuban Maximo Gomez and East Havana thermoelectric power plants, with the work to be done by
the Russian firm Inter Rao.171 Russian companies are
also participating in the construction of a new international airport at San Antonio de los Baños.172 They
are also reportedly involved in upgrading the port of
Mariel, 173 which Cuba hopes to turn into a major logistics hub, with potential investment from Russian
and other companies in the special economic zone
associated with the port.174
For years, going back to the Soviet period, Russian purchases of Cuban sugar have also been an
important part of the relationship between the two
countries.175 Nonetheless, although the Cuban government has sought foreign investment in its sugar industry, to date, Russian companies have not sought to
participate in the sector.176
With respect to tourism, Cuba has long been a favored destination for Russians seeking to escape their
nation’s cold climate, with an estimated 70,000 Russian tourists visiting Cuba in 2013.177 Yet, in recent
years, Russia has been engaged in negotiating visafree access to other countries in the Caribbean and
Latin America, to facilitate travel by its citizens to a
broader array of tourist destinations.
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Guyana.
Russian activities in Guyana have principally concentrated on the bauxite mining, although the RussiaGuyana relationship also reflects the political legacy
of Russian courtship of Guyanese leftists during the
Cold War. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP), under which Guyana achieved independence from Great
Britain, was significantly left-of-center, and Cheddi
Jagan, one of its two founding fathers, was openly
Marxist, defying the United States to maintain relations with Cuba after that country’s revolution in 1959.
Afro-Guyanese independence leader Forbes Burnham, who came to power after Jagan, openly courted
the Soviet Union for loans and fostered ties between
his People’s National Congress (PNC) and the Soviet
Communist Party.178
The continuity of the Russia-Guyana relationship from the Cold War period to today can be seen
in Guyana’s most recently retired President, Bharat
Jagdeo. Jagdeo, who still is believed to exercise considerable influence in his country, also has personal
ties to Russia, having studied economics there, receiving a degree from the People’s Friendship University
of Russia in 1990.179 In February 2010, Jagdeo made a
politically charged, albeit little recognized, state visit
to Russia in which he spoke warmly of his host and
openly invited Russia to expand its presence in the
Caribbean.180
In terms of Russia’s commercial relationship with
Guyana, the International Monetary Fund lists trade
between the two countries as negligible, with less than
$1 million in imports to, and exports from, the two
countries in 2013.181 Bauxite dominates the RussiaGuyana trade relationship, with 95 percent of Guya-
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nese exports to Russia in 2013 categorized as mineral
ores, followed by a small quantity of animal products
and textiles. Reciprocally, 60 percent of Russian exports to Guyana were rubber products; 18 percent,
iron and steel; and 8 percent, vehicles (cars, trucks,
buses, and motorcycles).182
Since the 1970s, the Soviet Union, and now Russia
as its successor, have purchased Guyanese bauxite.183
The physical presence of Russian companies in Guyana’s bauxite sector, however, dates to 2004, when the
mining company Russia Aluminum (RusAl) signed a
joint venture agreement with the Guyanese government to conduct mining operations in the country,
creating the Bauxite Corporation of Guyana (BCGI). In
2006, RusAl acquired Guyana’s state-owned Aroaima
Mining Company,184 transforming BCGI into a subsidiary of RusAl. Following RusAl’s consolidation of
control over Guyana’s bauxite assets and a 2007 visit
to Russia by President Jagdeo, Russia also sent a team
to evaluate possible construction of a hydroelectric facility to support the processing of the bauxite ore,185
although the plans did not result in a concrete project.
RusAl’s relationship with the Guyanese community
since establishing itself in the country have been difficult, with multiple strikes and a decision by BCGI
to “de-recognize” the Guyana Bauxite & General
Workers Union (GB&GWU), with whom it had been
negotiating.186
Although Russia has not highlighted its relationship with Guyana as part of its relationship with
Latin America, it has continued to focus attention
on Guyana in recent years. This includes the writeoff of $56.7 million in Guyanese debt to Russia in
February 2013.187
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Jamaica.
As a fellow part of the Caribbean basin, the history
and nature of Jamaica’s relations with Russia resemble
those of Guyana, as described earlier. Although the Jamaican socialist government of Michael Manley, who
came to power in 1972, developed friendly relations
with Cuba and, to some degree, the Soviet Union,188 a
relatively deeply rooted and widespread spirit of antiCommunism inhibited closer USSR-Jamaica relations
during the Cold War, and left Russia with a very limited base upon which to build relations today.189
The contemporary Russia-Jamaica commercial relationship is dominated by bauxite. The International
Monetary Fund recorded only $93 million in trade between the two countries in 2013, of which almost all
was Jamaican exports to Russia.190 Correspondingly,
99 percent of these exports were categorized as inorganic chemicals, presumably bauxite.191 The physical
presence of Russian companies in the Jamaican bauxite sector began in 2007 when RusAl merged with its
smaller rival, the Siberian Urals Aluminum Company
(SUAL), as well as the aluminum assets of the multinational Glencore, to form a new company United RusAl
with a 65 percent stake in the Jamaican company Aluminum Partners (Alpart), as well as a 93 percent stake
in the West Indies Alumina Company (Windalco).192
Russian bauxite operations in Jamaica experienced
difficulties almost from the beginning. With the fall
in global aluminum prices in the late-1990s, United
RusAl was force to scale back its Jamaica operations,
shutting down its Kirkvine and Alvine facilities in
March 2009,193 and closing Windalco in March 2010.194
Nonetheless, the company also took advantage of the
depressed market to expand its position in the sector,
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buying out the 35 percent stake that its Norwegian
partner, Norsk Hydro, had in the Alpart project,195
while also acquiring the Jamaican government’s 7
percent stake in Windalco in 2014,196 forgiving debts
owed to RusAl by Jamaica, in exchange its equity in
Windalco.197
As in Guyana, RusAl’s perceived heavy-handed
style in managing its bauxite operations in Jamaica
gave rise to some political tensions in the country. In
June 2014, the government threatened to strip RusAl
of its concession in the Kirkvine and Alvine refineries if they did not resume operations.198 Nonetheless,
beyond the issue of its plant closures, RusAl’s relationship with Jamaican society has generally been
positive. Following practices common among other
multinational companies operating in the country, the
company employed Jamaicans in management positions, and built up goodwill with its workers and the
surrounding community by providing public works
and social benefits.199
Beyond mining, Russia’s relationship with Jamaica
has also focused on tourism. In 2012, the two countries
agreed to establish nonstop flights.200 An estimated
10,000 Russian tourists traveled to Jamaica in the first
8 months following the start of the flights in 2013, a 644
percent increase over the same period during the prior
year.201 Nonetheless, the number of Russian tourists
traveling to the country continues to be low.202
Ecuador.
Although Russia’s relationship with Ecuador has
not been as high-profile as that with other ALBA
countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua, it has
maintained a modest but important relationship with
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Ecuador across a range of activities and sectors including military cooperation, petroleum, infrastructure construction, banking, and even nuclear power.
As with other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia began to expand its relationship with
Ecuador in November 2008, the wake of tension with
the United States over the crisis with Georgia. During that month, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa
met in Caracas with his Russian counterpart, Medvedev, who had traveled to Venezuela to participate in
a summit of ALBA countries. In October 2009, Correa
followed up by traveling to Moscow (the first time an
Ecuadorian leader had ever done so),203 and returned
for a second time in October 2013.204 To date, however,
neither Russian President Putin, nor his predecessor,
Medvedev have visited Ecuador.
With respect to military interactions, Russian arms
sales to Ecuador begun later than those to neighboring
Peru and Colombia. One of Russia’s first major end
item sales to Ecuador was a $22 million transaction,
selling 2 Mi-17Es to the Ecuadorian air force,205 with
the contract signed during Ecuadorian President Correa’s October 2009 trip to Moscow, and delivered in
January 2011.206 During Correa’s second trip to Moscow in October 2013, Russia sought to expand military cooperation, offering a $200 million loan for the
purchase of additional Mi-17s and other equipment.207
With respect to Russia-Ecuador commercial relations, the two countries registered $1.28 billion in
trade in 2013. Indeed, Ecuador was also one of the few
Latin American countries to enjoy a significant trade
surplus with Russia, with $1.13 billion in exports to
the country, vice $150 million in imports from it that
year.208 According to the UN COMTRADE database,
99 percent of Ecuador’s exports to Russia were concen-
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trated in four categories: fruit (68 percent of the total),
live trees and plants (23 percent), seafood (4 percent),
and miscellaneous edible items (4 percent). Similarly,
90 percent of Russian exports to Ecuador fell into four
categories: mineral fuels and oils (49 percent), fertilizers (23 percent), iron and steel (11 percent), and
cereals (7 percent).209
With respect to specific projects, the Russian company Gazprom is present in the oil sector, with a contract to operate in Block 6 in the Gulf of Guayaquil,
including a commitment to invest a total of $1.5 billion to develop it.210 Russian energy firms and banks
currently play a role in the renovation of Ecuador’s
electricity production and transmission infrastructure
(although Chinese banks and companies dominate
the 10 projects currently underway). Two ongoing
initiatives, are partially financed by Russia’s Ex-Im
bank and include the supply of components by the
Russian firm Inter Rao: (1) the $1 billion Cardenillo
power plant in the province of Azuay (with a contract
signed in 2014, and work on the $528 million facility
begun in 2011); 211 and (2) a $195 million thermoelectric
power plant.212 The Ecuadorian government has also
publicly expressed on multiple occasions its interest
in developing a nuclear power capability with Russian support, including a 2009 agreement between the
two countries,213 as well as a visit to Ecuador by the
Russian atomic energy agency, Rosatom.214
Nor has Russia-Ecuador cooperation been limited
to energy and military cooperation. When Ecuadorian
President Correa and Russian President Putin met in
October 2013, they discussed an estimated $1.5 billion in collaborative projects, including a 1,800-mile
rail link from the capital city of Quito in the Andes
Mountains, to the Pacific Ocean. As with Russia and
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Venezuela, there has also been financial cooperation
between Russia and Ecuador in support of commercial projects, with Ecuador’s central bank and Russia’s
Vnesheconombank signing a cooperation agreement
in June 2012.215
As with Mexico and other countries, when Russia suspended agricultural purchases from the United States and the EU, Ecuador was one of the Latin
American countries which expanded its own exports
to Russia to make up the difference.216
Colombia.
The close U.S.-Colombian relationship under Columbian President Alvaro Uribe has arguably inhibited Russia’s cautious engagement with the country, yet
Russia, nonetheless, continues to maintain low-level
military and economic interactions with Colombia,
while its current President, Juan Manuel Santos, has
indicated some desire to expand the Russia-Colombia
relationship.217
At the political level, Russia and Colombia’s mutual lack of emphasis on their relationship is illustrated by the fact that in recent years, no Colombian
president has traveled to Russia, nor has a Russian
president visited Colombia. Yet, Russia has indirectly
indicated its interest in the country. According to a
Colombian source, between approximately 2012 and
2014, the Russian embassy in that country doubled
its size to approximately 25 persons. In the context of
Colombia’s close relationship with the United States
in the post-Cold War era, Colombia has generally perceived Russia as a threat, due to its association with
leftist governments surrounding the country (including Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Nicaragua), as
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well as for its presumed support during the Cold War
era to groups fighting against the Colombian government, such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de
Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
or FARC).218
On the other hand, Russia has, at times, also been
a vehicle through which Colombia has sought to offset its dependence on the United States. The country’s
first major military acquisition from Russia, for example, dates to 1996, when the government of Columbian President Samper became angry with the United
States for decertifying his government on the issue of
counterdrug cooperation (and for having blocked him
from entering the United States because of his alleged
drug ties). Samper turned to Russia to acquire Mi-17
military transport helicopters.219 In 1997, Colombia
signed a $42 million contract for 10 Mi-17s,220 eventually acquiring a total of 24 of the helicopters, as well
as Antonov-32 high-wing transport aircraft. Although
the acquisition created an opening for sending Colombian pilots and other personnel to Russia for training
on the new systems. Although the Russians initially
established a presence in Colombian bases such as
Tolemaida for the maintenance of Russian-made helicopters and aircraft, in recent years such activities
have been outsourced to the Colombian company,
Vertical de Aviación.221
In a similar fashion, the Colombian air force does
not own the Russian Antonov-32 aircraft that it uses,
but rather leases them. Although Russian aircraft are
generally well regarded by Colombian officers for the
simplicity of their maintenance under harsh field conditions, the Colombian military has reportedly been
reluctant to acquire more Russian equipment. One
reason, according to Colombian defense experts, is to
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avoid complicating the logistics system, since acquiring Russian equipment would introduce more complexity into the nation’s logistics system. Arguably,
this would create difficulties in interoperability with
the United States and other allies, a consideration that
is becoming increasingly important to Colombia as it
expands its role in multilateral international missions
such as UN peacekeeping.222
Besides aircraft, Colombia is reportedly also producing Russian BTR-80 armored vehicles under license. However, the role of Russian companies and
personnel in this activity is not clear.223
With respect to Colombia-Russia military-to-military personnel interactions and leadership interactions, the most significant event in recent years was
the 2008 trip by then-Columbian Defense Minister
Juan Manuel Santos to Moscow to attend an Interpol
conference. Indeed, the visit was the first time that a
Colombian defense minister had traveled to Russia.224
Beyond the Santos visit, a small number of Colombian
officers have traveled to Russia for special forces and
other training, yet by contrast to the number who are
regularly sent to the PRC National Defense University
in Changping, China, no Colombians in recent years
have been sent to Russia’s senior staff academy.
In general, Russia has cautiously explored opportunities to improve its relationship with Colombia
when they have presented themselves. According to a
Colombian source, during the 2013 U.S. budget crisis,
the U.S. Government informed Colombia that it might
have to cut approximately $50 million in security assistance programs from the country, prompting Russia, and later the PRC, to offer to fill the deficiency if
the Colombian government wished.225 According to
the same source, the Colombian government did not
pursue the offer.
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Russia’s sales of a significant quantity of arms to
neighboring Venezuela is viewed with concern, more
because of Venezuelan instability than because of a
perceived credible offensive capability by the Venezuelan military against its Colombian neighbors. Similarly, Colombians are concerned by the previously
mentioned plans announced in February 2014 by
Shoigu to re-establish military facilities in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua,226 as well as Russia’s reoccupation of the electronic surveillance facility at Lourdes.227
These actions are collectively perceived as a strategic
encirclement of pro-U.S. Colombia by Russia through
its allies Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Ecuador.
Indeed, the November 2013 invasion of Colombian
airspace by two Russian bombers was seen in Colombia as signs of Russian hostile intent, reinforcing the
message sent by Russia’s deployment of nuclear-capable bombers and warships to the region in 2008.228
Beyond military affairs, Russia-Colombia nongovernmental narcotics and other criminal ties are a
growing concern. The current presence of the Russian
mafia in Colombia is believed to be less than during
the 1990s at the high-point of power of the Cali and
Medellin cartels. Incidents suggesting ongoing activity by Russian criminal groups in Colombia include
the 2013 murder of a Russian businessman under
mysterious conditions in Barrio Kennedy locality of
Bogota, as well as the implication of Russians in the
supply of components for an operation constructing narco-submarines near Buenaventura. Colombia is also believed to be the principal source of cocaine for the Russian market, which is believed to be
expanding.229
In terms of trade and investment, Russia’s ties with
Colombia are very modest. In 2013, Russia-Colombia bilateral trade was a mere $382 million, making
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Colombia Russia’s 12th largest trading partner in the
region. This volume was also insignificant in comparison to Colombia’s $10.5 million in bilateral trade with
the PRC that year, or even its $5.2 million in 2013 trade
with India.230 With respect to the composition of the
trade, according to the UN COMTRADE database, in
2013, 64 percent of Colombian exports to Russia were
“live trees and plants” (presumably flowers), followed
by 11 percent “miscellaneous edible preparations,” 7
percent coffee, and 5 percent “edible fruit.” In a pattern seen in Russian engagement with other countries
in the region, Russian exports to Colombia were dominated by fertilizers (46 percent), mineral fuels and
oils (12 percent), iron and steel (11 percent).231 There
have been attempts at the official level to strengthen
such interactions, including the Colombian-Russian
Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Trade,
Scientific and Technological Cooperation,232 but thus
far with minimal impacts.
With respect to specific projects, one Russian company in the petroleum sector, Lukoil, had a significant
presence in Colombia, but withdrew from the country in 2012. While the official reason given was that it
needed funds to develop a new oil find in the Middle
East,233 another contributing factor may have been extortion demands and other difficulties that Lukoil experienced in its area of operation.234 In 2012, the Russian energy company TNK, also considered investing
in Colombia,235 but did not pursue its interest.
In the mining sector, as in petroleum, Russian interests are reportedly conducting exploratory operations in the east of the country near the Venezuelan
border, but without a major formal presence to date.236
For the Russians, one of the minerals of interest is
coltan, used in modern smartphones, and believed to
be mined and sold in small quantities by the FARC.
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Russia also had hopes of marketing a number of energy projects in Colombia, including the construction
of hydroelectric power facilities by companies such as
Inter Rao, as well as the sale of nuclear reactors. To
date, such major projects have not gone forward.
On the other hand, because of the crisis, Russia
reportedly engaged in conversations with Colombian
agriculture producers about purchasing meats and
other products to compensate for European sources of
supply lost because of sanctions and increasing tensions over the Ukraine. Nonetheless, as of the time of
this writing, no major expansion of Colombian food
exports to Russia had occurred.
Peru.
Peru today is one of Russia’s most important arms
buyers and military partners in Latin America. It has
also maintained a significant political relationship
with Russia in the contemporary period, although one
which has received less scrutiny than Russia’s relationships with the ALBA regimes.
With respect to political interactions, Russian President Medvedev included Peru as one of four stops
in his November 2008 trip to Latin America, designed
to highlight Russia’s re-engagement with the region.
Almost 4 years later, in September 2012, Peruvian
President Ollanta Humala met with his Russian counterpart, Putin, during the APEC leaders’ summit in
Vladivostok, Russia.237 The two met again in July 2014
in Brazil, when Putin’s presence there for the BRICS
summit coincided with Humala’s visit to the country
for the CELAC forum.238 Four months later, in November 2014, Humala made a state visit to Russia en route
to the APEC summit in China, meeting with his coun-
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terpart, Putin. In doing so, Humala made history as
the first Peruvian president ever to visit Russia.239
One of the cornerstones of the Peru-Russia relationship for more than 40 years has been military ties.
The legacy of Russia’s presence in Peru dates to the
populist military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75), who pursued a quasi-socialist policy
during his time in power, nationalizing many key industries, and turning to Russia as the principal supplier of Peruvian military hardware. Much of the now
aging equipment in Peru’s military inventory dates
to this period, including 280 T-55 tanks (of which 50
remain in service), as well as an Mi-8 helicopter, 30
BRDM-2 armored cars, 12 BTR-60 armored personnel
carriers, 24 BM-21 GRAD, and two BM-13 multiple
launch rocket vehicles. Nonetheless, purchases of Russian equipment continued after the end of the Velasco
regime, including the acquisition of 24 MiG-29 fighter
aircraft in 1996 by the government of Alberto Fujimori,240 as well as Su-25 ground support aircraft and
Mi-25 attack helicopters,241 among other systems. The
legacy of collaborating with Russia remains particularly strong today among senior officers in the Peruvian Army, many of whom studied in the country as
part of military exchange programs.
As Russia began re-engaging with Peru in the
post-2008 period, it leveraged the abundance of Cold
War era Russian military hardware in the Peruvian
inventory, as well as the goodwill within the senior
Peruvian Army leadership toward Russia, to win new
military contracts and rebuild relations. The new acquisitions included a $106 million contract signed in
August 2008 for the upgrade of Peru’s aging fleet of
Mig-29s,242 of which 19 are still in service,243 with subsequent commitments for up to $400 million more in
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aircraft upgrades.244 The country also won a contract
to maintain and restore aging Russian helicopters. In
October 2012, four aging Mi-25 attack helicopters were
restored to service by Russian maintenance personnel
as part of this program.245
In 2010, following the Peruvian government’s difficulties with the acquisition of Chinese-made MBT2000 tanks,246 its army decided to acquire six Mi-171
and two Mi-35 P helicopters in support of operations
in Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE), site of operations by the terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso. In
December 2013, the Peruvian military signed a contract to acquire an additional 24 Mi-171 helicopters in
a contract valued at $528 million, in support of increasing the mobility of its forces operating in the region.247
The contract also included $180 million in offsets in
support of Peru’s economy and defense sector, including the co-production of parts,248 and the construction
of a base to maintain the helicopters near the Peruvian
Air Force Base in the La Joya district of Arequipa.249
By 2013, Russian military sales to Peru were advancing on all fronts. Highlighting the importance of
the relationship for Russia, Shoigu made Peru one of
two stops in his October 2013 visit to the region, with
the other being Brazil.250 During the visit, there were
discussions of the sale of 110 T-90S tanks to Peru to
replace the country’s aging stock of Russian T-55s,
as well as a possible factory for the manufacture of
military and civilian trucks by Russian manufacturer
Kamaz, although both transactions were subsequently postponed until after the 2016 Peruvian national
elections.251 In October 2013, Peru was also evaluating
the purchase of the Russian BTR-80 armored personnel carrier, although as of the time of this writing, the
sale had not gone forward.252 Similarly, the Peruvian
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army entered discussions concerning the acquisition
of Russian man-portable Igla air defense munitions
to replace their aging stock of Pechora missiles.253 Beyond military sales, Russia has also begun to expand
significantly its military education cooperation with
Peru, offering in 2012 to sponsor 200 Peruvian military
officers who would study in Russian universities.254
Paralleling initiatives in Nicaragua, in May 2012
Russia also announced a new counterdrug cooperation initiative with Peru.255 In March 2013, as part of
that effort, director of the Russian Antinarcotics State
Committee Victor Ivanov presented a counternarcotics action plan to Peruvian President Ollanta Humala,
including not only the training by Russians of Peruvian police antinarcotics units, but also the planning
and execution of “joint strategic operations.”256
By contrast to the substantial level of Peru-Russia
political and military engagement, economic ties between the nations are relatively modest. As of 2013,
Peru was Russia’s 11th largest trading partner in the
region, with a mere $403 million in bilateral trade.
With respect to Russian exports to Peru, mineral fertilizers comprise over 50 percent. Reciprocally, approximately 54 percent of Peruvian exports to Russia were
agricultural products, while 41 percent were mining
products.257
Peru and Russia have also collaborated in the space
arena. In November 2013, Russia launched two Peruvian microsatellites into low earth orbit, PUCP-Sat 1
and Pocket PUCP, from the Russian Yasny cosmodrome.258 In addition, as with a number of other Latin
American states, Peru is reportedly investigating the
use of the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system (a rival to the Western system GPS).259
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In the energy sector, Russian companies have
played a modest role in Peru, with the Russian petroleum company Gazprom reportedly interested in
participating in the construction of a new gas pipeline,
as well as a possible liquid natural gas compression
plant in the country.260 Beyond petroleum, Russia and
Peru have also had some discussions regarding nuclear power, including a visit to Peru by representatives
of Rosatom in March 2013, as well as the inclusion of
the topic during a state visit by Humala to Russia in
November 2014.261
In the energy and construction sectors more
broadly, the Russian companies Inter Rao and Power Machines have reportedly been pursuing work in
Peru, 262 but to date, no major projects have emerged.
During his November 2014 trip to Moscow, Russian
President Putin met with the head of Russia’s staterun company Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, to
discuss Russian participation in a planned transcontinental railroad link across Brazil and Peru,263 although
to date the Chinese have been the principal drivers of
the project.
In May 2014, Peru and Russia also launched talks
for a free trade accord,264 with negotiations still in
progress at the time of this writing.
Brazil.
Both economically and more broadly, Brazil is arguably Russia’s most important partner in the region,
although in specific areas, Russia’s partnerships with
countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Peru may overshadow the relationship with Brazil.
With respect to Russia-Brazil political engagement,
the two nations have a special partnership which, by
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contrast to Russia’s other relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean, goes beyond the region in both
its political and economic scope. Indeed, the “global”
nature of the partnership was manifested in the “Strategic Alliance Agreement” signed between those two
states in October 2005,265 as well as the membership of
both in the BRIC forum (established in 2006 and later
renamed “BRICS” to include South Africa).
Interactions between Russian and Brazilian leaders
in recent years has been regular, both as part of, and
independent from, the BRICS forum. Russian President Medvedev included Brazil in his four-nation trip
to Latin America in November 2008, then returned to
Brazil in April 2010 when the BRIC forum was hosted
in the country, then returned again in March 2013 as
Prime Minister.266 More recently, Russian President
Putin traveled to Brazil in July 2014 to attend the
BRICS summit in Fortaleza, making it the cornerstone
of his own four-nation Latin America trip. Brazilian
President Dilma Rousseff interacted with her Russian counterpart, President Putin, during her attendance at the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in
December 2012.267
The political nature of the interaction between
Russia and Brazil was further highlighted in March
2014, when Brazil abstained from its criticism of Russia in a key UN vote over the activities of the latter in
Crimea.268 By contrast to fellow BRICS partner China,
Russia explicitly supports Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.269
With respect to military interactions, Russia has
placed great emphasis on Brazil as an arms market,
with $306.7 million in arms sales to Brazil between
2008 and 2012. Russian arms sales to Brazil include
a $150 million270 contract in 2008 for 12 Mi-35 attack

60

helicopters, the last of which were delivered at the
end of 2014,271 as well as an agreement in 2012 to sell
Brazil seven Ka-62 medium transport helicopters.272 In
support of Brazil’s purchase of the Russian helicopters, Russian Helicopters, Inc. and the Brazilian firm
Odebrecht signed an agreement in 2013 to establish
a maintenance facility in Brazil to perform assembly,
maintenance, repair, and overhaul operations on such
helicopters.273 Beyond these deals, Brazil’s arms purchases from Russia also include negotiations for three
batteries of the Pantsir-S1 truck-mounted air defense
system, in a contract that could be worth $1 billion.274
In addition, Brazil has acquired other weapons from
Russia, including the Igla-S man-portable antiaircraft
missile, many of which were delivered to Brazil in
March 2010.275
In addition to such sales, Brazil is rumored to be
interested in acquiring the new supersonic BrahMos
missile, co-developed by Russia and India.276 While
such an acquisition would have a dramatic strategic
impact on the region, it has not yet gone beyond the
phase of general interest. In addition, Russian companies have been active participants in the annual LAAD
defense expo which occurred in April 2015 in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, as well as other military expositions in
the region. In March 2014, the Brazilian firm Odebrecht
and Russian firm Rostec signed an agreement on the
sidelines of the FIDAE military air show in Chile.277
Despite such successes, Russia’s advances in its
defense relationship with Brazil have arguably been
much less than hoped. Russia lost its bid, for example,
to sell Brazil the Sukhoi-35 fighter as part of the country’s FX-2 fighter modernization effort,278 with Brazil
ultimately choosing the Swedish Gripen NG.279 Similarly, Brazil’s acquisition of Mi-35 attack helicopters
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was terminated in 2014 after the delivery of only the
original 12 units. Russian difficulties in selling arms
to Brazil have occurred in part, because the country
has its own domestic arms industry which, in some
sectors, competes with equipment that Russia would
like to sell. As an example, in 2010, the Brazilian
federal police entered into conversations with Rosoboronexport over the possible purchase of the GAZ2975 Tigr light armored vehicle for use in riot control
missions.280 However, the sale was vetoed because it
competed with a similar Brazilian-made vehicle, the
Guarani. In a similar fashion, Russian interest in selling Brazil a nuclear submarine was also unsuccessful,
reportedly because Russia was unwilling to transfer
a sufficient amount of technology to the Brazilian
defense industry.281
With respect to military-to-military personnel interactions and leadership visits, senior Russian officials periodically travel to Brazil, such as the October
2013 trip by Defense Minister Shoigu. Such contacts
also include lower-level interaction, including training provided by Russian instructors in May 2010 in
Brazil on the use of the then recently acquired Igla-S
man-portable antiaircraft missiles.282
With respect to the economic relationship between
the two countries, as noted previously, Brazil is by
far Russia’s most important trading partner in the region, with its $5.9 billion in bilateral trade with Russia in 2013, accounting for 31 percent of all Russian
trade with the region for that year. The relationship
is a trade surplus in Brazil’s favor, with $3.3 billion
in Brazilian exports to Russia, and $2.6 billion of Brazilian imports. A substantial portion of this trade on
both sides is agricultural goods, with 94 percent of
Brazilian exports to Russia comprised of agricultural

62

products, including beef and wheat,283 and 65 percent
of Russian exports to Brazil comprised by fertilizer,
although Russia also exports significant quantities of
metals and high tech machinery to Brazil as well.284
In the petroleum sector, Russian firms have very
little presence in Brazil’s newly developed offshore oil
fields. One exception is Russian firm Rosneft285 whose
subsidiary TNK is involved in a joint venture the Brazilian firm HRT Participacoes em Petróleo in the Solimoes river basin.286 In addition, Gazprom reportedly
has opened up a representative office in the country,
with plans in investing in Brazilian offshore oil.287 In
mining, Russian companies such as RusAl and Rusoro are also relatively absent in Brazil. One of the few
examples occurred in 2011, when the Russian mining
and coal company OAO Mechel entered an $800 million joint venture with Brazilian iron company Usina
Sidurigica do Para.288
In energy, in Brazil, as in Argentina, Russia has
sought to participate in the possible expansion of the
nation’s nuclear power generation capacity,289 with
the Russian commercial nuclear agency Rosatom signing a memorandum of understanding with the Brazilian private energy and construction firm Comarga
Correa in July 2014 regarding the construction of a
nuclear waste storage facility in Brazil and possible
Russian participation in a future Brazilian nuclear reactor.290 Reflecting the structural similarities between
Russia and Brazil in select sectors, Russian construction companies have been unable to penetrate Brazil’s
electricity infrastructure market, where they have had
to compete directly with capable, well-financed and
well-connected Brazilian competitors such as Odebrecht. Nevertheless, undeterred, Russian companies
have expressed hopes of playing a role in the con-
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struction of hydroelectric and thermoelectric power
facilities in the country.291
In the commercial aircraft sector, competition exists between Russian and Brazilian companies. Russia
reportedly blocked the Brazilian company Embraer
from access to the Russian private jet market because
the commercial side of the Russian aircraft manager Sukhoi was afraid that Brazilian aircraft would
compete with Sukhoi’s candidate for the regional jet
market, the “Interjet Superjet.”292 On the other hand,
there are a number of Brazil-Russia partnerships in
the manufacturing and technology sectors, including
joint ventures by the companies Kaspersky Laboratories, Biocad, and Qiwi.293
Russian firms are venturing into Brazil’s financial
market, albeit in a limited fashion. In June 2012, for
example, the Russian investment firm VTB Capital
announced that it was cooperating with the Brazilian
firm BTG Pactual to establish an investment presence
in the Brazilian market.294 Finally, as with other countries in the region, Brazil has positioned itself to benefit from Russia’s suspension of agricultural purchases
from European suppliers as tensions expanded over
events in the Ukraine in the summer of 2014.295
Bolivia.
As with the other countries of ALBA, Russia has
enjoyed a close relationship with Bolivia in the post2008 era, although arguably not as close as its relationships with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, or
even as close as its relationships with key non-ALBA
partners such as Brazil and Peru. At the political level,
Bolivian President Evo Morales traveled to Moscow
in July 2013 for a forum of gas exporting countries,
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where he met with his Russian counterpart, Putin.296
Morales also met with Putin as part of a special dinner for visiting heads of state in July 2014.297 Significant presidential level diplomacy also includes a
2009 trip to Russia by Morales to meet with President
Putin’s predecessor, Medvedev,298 as well as a meeting
between Morales and Putin in Caracas, Venezuela, in
April 2011. Such interactions have also included ongoing lower-level visits such as the trip by Bolivian
Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca to Moscow in
May 2011.
On the other hand, unlike fellow ALBA nations
such as Venezuela, it is of note that Bolivia did not
diplomatically recognize the breakaway republics of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the 2008 Georgia
civil war. The country is also one of the few nations in
the region to continue to require a visa for Russians to
enter the country, although the procedure by which
they request the visa upon arrival at a port of entry
makes the requirement only pro forma. Russia-Bolivia
engagement includes both military and commercial
activities, yet to date, few major projects contemplated
between Russia and Bolivia have gone forward on either front.
With respect to arms sales, from 2009, the Bolivian
military was in discussions with Russia for the possible purchase of 10 Mi-17 transport helicopters,299 as
well as the acquisition from Russia of a $30 million
Antonov Business Jet (Antonov BJ)300 to serve as the
President’s executive aircraft, (announced in September 2009) and a credit of $250 million to cover the
purchases.301 As part of the deal, the two countries
also discussed establishing a region-wide center for
aircraft maintenance at Airbase 92, near the Bolivian
city of Cochabamba,302 although the plan never went
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forward. In the end, neither the helicopter purchase
nor the purchase of the Antonov business jet were
realized. The Bolivian military reportedly decided
that it did not have sufficient resources for the helicopters, while President Morales decided to purchase
a Falcon 900EX (the type used by one of his favorite
soccer teams, Manchester United) as his presidential
aircraft.303 Despite these setbacks, the foreign sales
organization for Russian arms, Rosoboronexport, has
had some successes in Bolivia. In March 2014, for example, a commission from the Bolivian government
traveled to Russia to evaluate a more modest Russian
offer to sell Bolivia two Mi-17s.304 As with other nations in the region, Bolivia has maintained a regular
interchange with senior Russian military officials,
including an August 2013 trip to Bolivia by Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Major General Oleg Leonidovich Salukov.305
With respect to commercial interactions more
broadly, Bolivia and Russia registered only a token
$17 million in trade in 2013.306 Of Bolivian exports to
Russia in 2013, 73 percent were inorganic chemicals,
with almost the entire remainder composed of fruit
and nuts. Reciprocally, 71 percent of Russian exports
to Bolivia similarly were in the category of inorganic
chemicals, with most of the remainder composed of
paper products.307
As with other Latin American countries, Russia has also expressed interest in launching satellites
for Bolivia as well as selling the country nuclear reactors.308 To date, however, such projects have not
gone forward.
In the petroleum sector, both Russian firms Rosneft and Gazprom have been active in the country.
The relationship began to improve greatly in Decem-
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ber 2008 when Gazprom signed a $4.5 billion exploration agreement with the Bolivian government.309 Also
in December, Russia spent $4 million on a study of the
Bolivian gas industry, and later indicated its intention
to open a joint Russia-Bolivia center for gas exploration.310 Gazprom today has a joint venture in Bolivia
with Total Oil to explore the Azero block, with a total
pledged investment of $130 million. Rosneft, for its
part, committed to explore for petroleum in Bolivia in
November 2013,311 and in July 2014, during a meeting
with Bolivian President Evo Morales in Brazil, Russian
President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed that the company
was still considering an investment in the country.312
In mining sector, Russian firms are reportedly interested in exploiting Bolivia’s lithium deposits, concentrated in the Uyuni salt flats,313 believed to be the
largest in the world. To date, as with numerous other
interested international actors, the Russians have not
been successful in securing a concession from the
Bolivian government to do so.
Argentina.
Argentina historically has maintained a strong relationship with Russia as an economic, and, at times, a
security partner, despite the country’s history of tensions with Russia over its perceived support for leftist groups regarded as threats by the nation’s military
government.314
In the 1980s, when the United States suspended
grain sales to the former Soviet Union, Argentina was
one of the countries which significantly expanded the
export of foodstuffs to the country to compensate for
the loss.315 Indeed, much of the export-oriented cereals
sector in Argentina today is a product of the demand
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for exports to the Soviet Union during that period.
U.S. support for the British position in the 1982 war
for control of the Falklands/Malvinas islands also
reportedly strengthened ties between the Argentine
military government and the Soviet Union.316
Argentina today is also the host of Latin America’s
largest population of ethnic Russians who immigrated to the country during the late-19th and early-20th
centuries.317
The continuing importance of Argentina to Russia
in the contemporary context was highlighted by then
President Medvedev’s stop in the country in April
2010 en route to attend the second BRIC summit in
Brazil,318 as well as inclusion of the country in Russian President Putin’s July 2014 trip to the region.319
The relationship has also included some political cooperation, in addition to military and economic ties.
Argentina abstained, for example, on a 2014 UN vote
condemning Russian activities in the Crimea. Reciprocally, President Putin indicated, during multiple visits
on multiple occasions, support for Argentina’s claim
against Britain over the Falkland Islands.320
With respect to military cooperation, Russia has
long sought to sell a broad array of arms to Argentina,
including Mi-17 and Mi-35M helicopters, Igla manportable missiles, high-speed missile boats and patrol
craft, Buk-M1-2 and Tunguska air defense systems,
military vehicles, and rifles.321 Argentina’s defense
budget has been very limited in recent years, however.
One of the few major purchases actually to occur was
a 20 billion euro deal for five Mi-171 E-model helicopters with an associated package for maintenance and
pilot training.322 In 2012, Rosoboronexport announced
Argentine interest in the follow-on purchase of three
Kamov Ka-226T helicopters.323 In the same year, Ar-
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gentina also announced construction of a new ship
with Russia for transportation to the South Pole.324
In December 2014, the Argentine defense ministry
signed an agreement to buy four Neftegaz-class supply vessels from the Russian state-owned enterprise
Zarubezhneft in a deal valued at $8.1 million.325
With respect to commercial interactions, Argentina
was Russia’s third most important trade partner in the
region after Brazil and Venezuela, registering $1.54
billion in bilateral trade in 2013. Of this amount, only
$334 million was Russian exports to Argentina, while
$1.21 billion was Russian imports from the country,326
due to the importance of Argentina as a provider of
foodstuffs to Russia. In 2013, 88 percent of Argentine
exports to Russia were agricultural goods, with meat
the leading category. Reciprocally, 65 percent of Russian exports to Argentina that year were mineral fuels; with another 22 percent, fertilizers; and 4 percent,
components for the nuclear industry.327
With respect to specific nondefense projects, notable activity between the two countries have occurred
in the space sector, nuclear and hydroelectric power,
and petroleum, among others. In the field of space, in
2010, Argentina signed an accord that committed it to
participation in Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system.328 In the nuclear power domain, Russian
atomic energy agency Rosatom has expressed interest
for a number of years in participating in helping Argentina to expand and modernize its nuclear power
generation facilities.329 In July 2014, during his visit
to Argentina, Russian President Putin indicated that
his country was participating in the bidding process
for Argentina’s next nuclear reactor, Atucha III,330 although Argentina signed a $2 billion agreement with
China to finance the long delayed reactor just weeks
after the Russian declaration.331
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In the petroleum sector, Russian company Gazprom is working with Argentine state oil company
Enarsa on the production of liquefied natural gas
(LNG).332 With respect to oil exploration and drilling
operations, when the Argentine government nationalized the assets of Spanish company Repsol YPF,
Russia was one of the countries that it approached to
potentially take over the property.333 In the end, however, the Argentine government contracted with the
U.S. energy company Chevron, rather than Russian
companies, to develop the concession.334 In addition,
Russian companies Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil,
along with other international players, have been invited by Argentine authorities to invest in the development of the Vaca Muerte shale oil fields, believed to
be one of the largest in the region.335 Although Russian
activities in Argentina’s petroleum sector was not a
focus of Russian President Putin’s July 2014 visit to
Argentina,336 Gazprom chairman Alexander Medvedev reportedly discussed the matter with a visiting
Argentine trade delegation just 2 months later.337
Russian companies are also competing for a number of energy industry infrastructure projects in the
country. Gazprom, for example, has expressed interest in participating in the construction of a $1.5 billion
gas pipeline between Argentina and Bolivia.338 Separately, Russian firm Inter Rao is competing to build
the Chihuido I and II hydroelectric facilities in the
Argentine province of Neuquén with the backing of
the Russian financial institution Gazprombank.339 Inter Rao has already won a contract for the preliminary
design phase of the $2 billion Chihuido I facility.340
The Russian firm Power Machines similarly played a
role in the construction of the Caracoles hydroelectric
plant, which opened in 2008, and in 2011, signed a con-
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tract for the supply of equipment to the Punta Negara
power plant.341 Power Machines was further part of a
consortium which sought a role in the construction of
the Jorge Copernic and Nestor Kirchner hydroelectric
facilities on the Santa Cruz River. The firm ultimately
lost the bid to the Chinese Gezouba group.342
In agriculture, as with Brazil and other South
American nations, Argentina has also sought to take
advantage of Russia’s suspension of agricultural purchases from Europe due to the escalating crisis in the
Ukraine. In September 2014, Argentina sent a delegation to negotiate expanded meat exports to Russia.343
Other Russian commercial interests in Argentina reportedly include interest by Russian truck producer
Kamaz in the Argentine market,344 as well as Energomashexport,345 RusHydro,346 and Russian financial firms including Sberinvest Russian Bank, Aterra
Capital, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund.347
Russia-Argentina commercial engagement even
involves the media. In October 2014, in a public ceremony, the Argentine President Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner announced that Russia TV would be broadcast in Argentina as a free public channel.348
Paraguay.
The Paraguay-Russia relationship traditionally has
been dominated by Paraguayan food exports to Russia, and traditionally has not been overtly political.
Although the nation has considered the purchase of
Russian arms, including a 2011 Russian offer to sell six
combat aircraft for its air force349 and transport aircraft
for its national police,350 Paraguay has not yet bought
Russian end items. Nor has there been a significant
Russia-Paraguay military relationship.

71

With respect to commercial interactions, bilateral
trade between Paraguay and Russia in 2013 was a
modest $269 million, making the nation Russia’s 13th
largest trading partner in the region. Virtually all Paraguayan exports to Russia during the year were agricultural products, with 57 percent of the total value
being the export of meat.351 Indeed, Russia has been
the major purchaser of Paraguayan beef, accounting
for 77 percent of the country’s exports.352 Reflecting
the importance of the relationship, Russia even helped
Paraguay to repair and modernize one of its meat processing facilities in 2012 to support Paraguayan beef
exports to Russia.353 Paraguay was one of the countries hoping to benefit from the suspension of Russian
beef purchases from the United States and Europe in
2014.354 Reciprocally, 95 percent of Russian exports to
Paraguay in 2013 was fertilizer.355
Beyond agricultural trade, Russian nuclear energy
agency Rosatom reportedly has visited the country
multiple times, including an attempt to interest Paraguay in purchasing technology to develop its uranium
into the refined material yellowcake, usable for nuclear reactors. To date, no public project has emerged
from the talks.356
Uruguay.
As with Paraguay, the most significant dimension
of Uruguay’s relationship with Russia has been exports
of meat to Russia, although in 2013, the PRC replaced
Russia as Uruguay’s most significant extra-regional
purchaser of beef.357 In political terms, the UruguayRussia relationship has not included the amount of
high-level contacts as other relationships mentioned
in this monograph, although Russian President Pu-
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tin did meet his Uruguayan counterpart, Jose Mujica,
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 2014, along with
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and Bolivian
President Morales, in a special dinner sponsored by
Argentine President de Kirchner.358
With respect to arms purchases, although Uruguay
has limited resources to buy military hardware, Russia
has sold some military items to the country. Uruguay
was, for example, one of the first nations in the region
to purchase the Russian Tigr light armored vehicle,
with the Uruguayan national police acquiring three of
the vehicles in 2011 as part of a force modernization
program.359 Uruguay also uses Russian Ural heavyduty trucks in its military inventory, acquiring eight of
these vehicles in August 2012.360 In addition, in 2012,
the Uruguayan police bought $1.2 million in Russian
small arms as part of that force modernization.361
In addition to the Uruguayan police, as of late-2014,
the nation’s military was reportedly considering the
acquisition of Russian Yak-130 training aircraft, and
possibly Russian Saburov or Steregushchy class naval
patrol vessels in a deal that would have included Uruguayan meat in barter as part of the transaction.362
With respect to the broader economic relationship, in 2013, Uruguay registered only $166 million in
bilateral trade with Russia in 2013, all but $1 million
were exports, the vast majority of them agricultural
goods.363 In 2013, 51 percent of Uruguay’s exports to
Russia were meat products, with dairy goods accounting for an additional 33 percent.364
With respect to nuclear energy, Uruguay has expressed interest in cooperating with Russia to develop
a reactor for electricity generation.365 To date, nothing
has come of the initiative. In petroleum, Russian firm
Gazprom has expressed interest exploring for oil and
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gas off of the coast.366 Lukoil has expressed a similar
interest, but to date, nothing has come of these initiatives.367 In the domain of agriculture, as with other
countries in the region, Uruguay indicated in July 2014
its intention to expand such exports in lieu of Russia’s
suspension of food purchases from Europe.368
Chile.
As one of the closest allies of the United States in
the Southern Cone, Chile’s interactions with Russia
have been minimal.369 Like many other nations in the
region, during the Cold War, conservative Chilean
military governments looked at Russia with suspicion due to its presumed support for leftist groups in
their country.370 Nonetheless, the return of Michelle
Bachelet to the Chilean presidency in March 2014 with
the backing of a far more left-of-center coalition has
opened the door for a significant expansion of ChileRussia engagement.
Prior to 2014, the most recent visit by a Russian
president to Chile was Putin’s trip to Santiago in November 2004 to meet with then-Chilean President Ricardo Lagos. With Bachelet’s return to the Presidency
enabled by left-of-center parties such as the Chilean
Communist Party, however, the level and tempo of
diplomatic interactions have increased markedly. Two
months after Bachelet’s March 2014 inauguration,
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made an official visit
to Chile.371 Six months later, President Bachelet met
with Putin on the sidelines of the APEC leaders’ summit in Beijing, in a dialogue that Putin subsequently
described as “intense.”372 The Bachelet-Putin meeting also produced a commitment for Chilean Foreign
Minister Heraldo Muñoz to travel to Russia to follow-

74

up on issues raised by the presidential discourse.373
Moreover, Bachelet has also reportedly invited Putin
to visit Chile.374
With respect to military affairs, Chile’s interaction
with Russia historically has been minimal. In the domain of arms sales and associated training and maintenance contracts, Chile has consistently relied on U.S.
and European military equipment. Indeed, one of the
few Chilean purchases of Russian arms occurred during the Cold War era, when Chile’s Marxist president
Salvador Allende purchased DShK machine guns
from the Soviet Union. Ironically, the weapons were
used by the Chilean military in deposing Allende on
September 11, 1973, including in the attack on the
presidential palace, La Moneda.375 More recently, in
2009, Chile announced its intention to acquire five Mi17 helicopters from Russia in a contract valued at $80
million, prompting the U.S. Secretary of Commerce
to express his disillusionment in uncharacteristically
negative terms.376 Although Chile, like Brazil and Venezuela, reportedly has also been interested since 2008
in the BrahMos missile, jointly developed by India and
Russia, there have been no specific announcement in
the public domain about doing so.
With respect to military-to-military contacts, there
have been almost no recent, high-level visits between
Chilean and Russia defense officials. Nor have there
been significant academic interchanges or joint exercises between the countries.377 Nonetheless, the warming of relations under the second Bachelet administration in Chile has also carried over to the defense
sector, with the previously noted April 2014 visit to
Chile by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, including
a meeting with Chilean Defense Minister Jorge Burgos
in which the “potential for military exchanges” was
discussed.378
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With respect to trade, Chile was only Russia’s
ninth largest partner in the region, with $752 million
in bilateral trade recorded in 2013. While not insignificant, such a level of commercial interchange contrasts
unfavorably with Chile’s $33.9 billion in trade with
the PRC the same year, or its $3.90 billion in 2013 trade
with India.379 With respect to the composition of the
trade, 45 percent of Chilean exports to Russia during
this period was seafood, while another 33 percent was
fruit and nuts. Of Russian exports to Chile, 87 percent
were comprised of rubber products, fertilizer, and
mineral fuels, in that order.380
In the space sector, Russia has collaborated with
Chile to reactivate the Pulkovo astronomical observatory located at the El Roble mountaintop in Chile.381
In energy, the firm RusHydro has been involved in
minor projects in the country, such as one for electricity generation from wave action in 2011.382 Chile has
discussed interest in a Free Trade Agreement with
Russia,383 but to date, the initiative has not borne fruit.
IMPACTS ON THE REGION AND ON
THE UNITED STATES
As an economic phenomenon, Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean is modest
by comparison to the size, scope, and rate of expansion of China’s commercial and military presence during the same period. Moreover, Russia’s future ability
to finance arms purchases, construction projects, petroleum, and mining activities in the region is likely
to be seriously limited by long-term downward pressures on the price of petroleum, the export of which
is a key source of revenues for the Russian state, as
well as a source of resources for firms such as Ros-
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neft, Lukoil, and Gazprom as they pursue projects in
Latin America and the Caribbean. It is probable that
the resources available to Russia will also continue to
be limited by the adverse effect of economic sanctions
from the United States and Europe.
Such limitations notwithstanding, since 2008, Russia has demonstrated a clear and persistent willingness to expand its political, military, and economic
footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to
do so in a manner that does not shy away from projecting military force close to U.S. borders, or engaging in
political and security cooperation in the region in a
fashion that explicitly challenges the United States.384
While Russia’s activity may be on a small scale and
limited to a handful of states and sectors, its presence will likely be a persistent facet of the new globally-interconnected strategic environment currently
reshaping the region.
Economic Impacts.
In commercial terms, the impact of Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America is concentrated on a relatively small group of countries, including the ALBA
regimes, plus Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. Those impacts are also concentrated on a limited number of
economic sectors, including military sales, petroleum,
atomic and hydroelectric energy generation, mining,
and agriculture. By contrast to Chinese trade with
the region, Russia’s manufactured products, such as
Lada cars and buses and Kamaz trucks, have not significantly penetrated Latin American and Caribbean
markets except in those special cases such as Cuba or
Nicaragua, where they have been given as gifts, or access has been granted on politically favorable terms.
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Even in sectors such as petroleum and mining,
in which Russia has some presence in the region, its
companies have proven to be as vulnerable to the risks
of Latin American markets as their Western counterparts. In some countries, including Venezuela and
Nicaragua, select Russian companies such as Rosneft
may have received special access because of the country’s political relationship with the host government.
Yet even so, such activities, including oil investment
in Venezuela’s Orinoco tar belt, arms sales, and participation in the Nicaragua Canal, each depend on Russian financing, the availability of which is limited by
Russia’s mediocre economic circumstances,385 made
worse by the effects of persistently low oil prices and
expanding international sanctions.386
By contrast to the expanding presence of Chinese
companies in the region387 and the associated growth
of Chinese soft power through the hope of commercial benefit,388 Russia does not appear to be on the path
to displace U.S. companies from commercial markets
in the near future, nor to exert significant influence
over Latin American and Caribbean states through
their hopes for access to Russian markets, investments
and loans.
Strategic Impacts.
Despite the aforementioned limitations, Russia’s
presence in Latin America nonetheless significantly
impacts the strategic U.S. position in Latin America.
Such impacts do not, however, come from Russia
alone, but the way in which Russian re-engagement
with the region interacts with the activities of other
extra-hemispheric actors in Latin America and the
Caribbean to alter the dynamics of the region.
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Such impacts may be divided into three categories:
1. Undermining the disposition of key actors in the
region to work with the United States on trade, security, and other initiatives, both within the region, and
beyond it.
2. Isolating strongly pro-U.S. regimes such as
Colombia and Chile.
3. Arming, contributing to the survival of, and
politically emboldening anti-U.S. regimes in the region currently represented by the states of ALBA
and Argentina, including collaboration of these regimes in hosting Russian military forces, and activities in the region that present strategic threats to the
United States.
Through commercial and security collaboration,
Russia gives states such as Brazil and Peru options
other than working with the United States or the EU as
their principal security partner, as well as giving them
alternatives to U.S.-led initiatives to address problems
of importance to the region from trade and development, to narcotrafficking and organized crime, to
standards for democracy and human rights.
Engagement with Russia, in conjunction with other
actors such as China, has also undermined, in subtle
ways, U.S.-led concepts for multilateral organization
in the Americas such as the OAS and the Inter-American system. While Russia has not explicitly promoted
alternative forms of sub-regional organization that
exclude the United States such as UNASUR, CELAC,
and ALBA, it has been more receptive to engaging
with these multilateral organizations, than it has to
working with the OAS, and that has contributed to
the perceived functionality and importance of these
organizations.
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Beyond the region itself, the increasing independence of such actors in the Americas makes it difficult for the United States to mobilize coalitions to act
with authority outside the region, from votes in the
UN to the imposition of international sanctions. While
difficulties such as Mexico and Chile’s opposition
to a UN-sanctioned role that Iraq cannot be blamed
on Russia,389 the interest of Latin American states in
working with Russia undermines the U.S. position in
more subtle ways. In the summer of 2014, for example,
Russia’s ability to turn to Latin America as a food supplier allowed it to defy U.S. and European sanctions
over its actions in the Ukraine, and reciprocate by
cutting off Russian imports of European agricultural
products.390
Beyond such impacts on coalition formation, Russian engagement with the region on the United States
also adversely impacts pro-U.S. states such as Colombia, Chile, and even Honduras, which arguably perceive themselves as increasingly surrounded by proRussian states, and threatened by Russia’s activities
in the region. In the case of Colombia, Russia’s close
political, military, and economic relations with the
three ALBA states that surround it (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba), and perceived historic Russian ties to
groups that fight against the Colombia government
internally, such as the FARC and the ELN, increase
the Colombian government’s sense of encirclement
by hostile forces, and its interest in informal security
guarantees from its traditional ally, the United States.
For some in Honduras, the prospect of renewed Russian engagement with neighboring El Salvador, in
combination with the strong Russian position in Nicaragua and Cuba, raises similar fears of “encirclement.”
With respect to the ALBA states, the economic viability of regimes such as the Bolivarian government
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of Venezuela arguably is enabled more by loans and
support from the PRC than from Russia. Nonetheless,
Russian activities reinforces, and sometimes compliments, the impacts of Chinese engagement in select
sectors such as petroleum, arms, and construction, and
provides political support for the anti-Western projects of these countries in a way that the PRC, to date,
has been reluctant to do. As suggested earlier, Russian
arms and investment thus make these regimes somewhat more viable, and potentially more dangerous to
their neighbors.
In turn, the viability of these regimes, and their
willingness to host Russian military and irregular activities, creates an opportunity for Russia to operate
in the region in a manner that threatens the United
States in the hemisphere when it wishes to do so. During a conflict involving Russia in another theater, for
example, such allies present Russia with options to act
in Latin America and the Caribbean so as to force the
United States to divert attention and resources away
from its activities in other parts of the globe. Examples
of such possible actions include basing or resupplying
nuclear-capable military assets in countries in close
proximity to the United States, such as Venezuela,
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. Other possibilities include supporting military action against a U.S. ally,
such as a Venezuelan occupation of historically contested Colombian territory on its border, or a Nicaraguan incursion against Costa Rica.
As noted previously, sending such a message was
arguably one of the principal motives behind Russian
deployments of its Tu-160 bombers, and later warships, to the Caribbean in 2008, as well as the more
recent proposals for base access and to conduct long
range patrols in the Caribbean.391
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP
In general terms, Russian re-engagement in Latin
America and the Caribbean demonstrates the importance of considering not only the challenges to U.S.
national security that emerge from Latin America
itself, but how extra-regional actors with objectives
adverse to the United States, such as Russia, may directly or indirectly impact U.S. national security, and
hemispheric security, by acting there.
In broad terms, this analysis reinforces the need
for U.S. decisionmakers to consider Latin America in
strategic terms, rather than focusing on its individual
challenges, such as drugs, crime, and immigration, as
law enforcement or developmental issues to be managed. With the end of the Cold War, the United States
has arguably ceased to seriously consider Latin America as a source of potential challenges beyond issues
of crime and migration. The United States has fallen
into the illusion that Latin America and the Caribbean
are isolated from the global strategic landscape, rather
than a fundamental part of it. Even if the endogenous
threats to U.S. national security may be minimal, the
ideological orientations of governments of the region,
and their relationships with extra-hemispheric powers such as Russia, may take on new relevance for
U.S. national security as a product of what happens in
other parts of the world.
At a policy level, and within the Department of
Defense (DoD), the U.S. response to the new engagement in the hemisphere by Russia and other extraregional actors should begin with a detailed analysis
of how the latter might attempt to build upon and employ its presence in the region under a broad range of
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scenarios. Such scenarios should include how Russia,
in conjunction with (or in opposition to), other global
actors, might act in the region in the near-term, as well
as what it could do in a future in which it is engaged in
a major conflict with the United States (including the
use of military force in, or from the region).
Ideally, analysis of such scenarios should include
consideration of variants with a range of assumptions
about how other major global actors may be oriented
toward both Russia and the United States, such as
whether or not China would collaborate with Russia in the region in the context of global hostilities
with the United States. The analysis should include
an evaluation of both the likelihood and gravity of
the consequences contemplated, as well as indicators
for detecting the course of action, leveraging associated opportunities, and countering or mitigating its
adverse effects.
In a conflict scenario, in evaluating whether Latin
American states would risk openly assisting a competitor such as Russia against the United States, analysts
should also consider conditions under which such an
anti-U.S. regime in the region might calculate that the
United States might not prevail in the broader conflict,
or might not be able or willing to impose consequences for such behavior. Beyond assessing the possibility
of Latin American states providing direct assistance to
Russia during a global conflict, such as access to bases
or intelligence support, analysts should also consider
ways in which states of the region could impact the
outcome of the global conflict by withholding cooperation, such as not supporting the U.S. position on
the crisis in international forums such as the UN, not
contributing personnel or resources to an international coalition deployed to the conflict zone, not provid-
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ing intelligence support to the United States, or not
allowing the United States to use its territorial waters
or airspace.
Finally, using the specific scenarios generated, the
United States should consider strategies that it could
use to counter Russian actions in the Western Hemisphere during a conflict, in shaping the conflict in the
lead-up to it, and in shaping the strategic environment
in the present day to mitigate or reduce the probability of undesirable outcomes. In developing strategies
to manage the identified risks and pursue associated
opportunities, the United States should consider collaboration with like-minded extra-hemispheric actors,
whose values and interests in resisting the Russian
advance in Latin America coincide with that of the
United States. Japan, South Korea, and India each are
arguably candidates to collaborate with the United
States in select areas. Each has commercial interests
in the region, each is adversely impacted by the expansion of Russia’s presence globally, and each has an
interest in strengthening its own ties with the United
States in the face of the expansion of rivals in its own
region, which include not only Russia, but also others
such as the PRC.
At the level of combatant commands, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command, and
their respective Army components, U.S. Army North,
and U.S. Army South, decisionmakers should be particularly attentive to the risks and opportunities presented by individual countries. In Peru, for example,
the United States should build upon its strong support
to the nation as a provider of intelligence and training in counterterrorist and counterdrug operations
to strengthen its relationship as partner of choice, by
contrast to Russia, whose relationship arguably has
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focused principally on equipment, which may not be
dedicated to those areas of the country, such as the
VRAE-M, which need it most.
In Cuba, the United States should be attentive to
the current regime’s interest in securing the lifting of
economic sanctions, particularly as the economy of
its Venezuelan patron crumbles. Such interest may be
leveraged to help persuade Cuba not to cooperate with
Russia in ways which would create strategic threats
to the United States, on the grounds that such cooperation might create problems for the political case
in the United States for the lifting of sanctions. Such
politically sensitive Cuban actions might include permitting Russia to have renewed access to the signals
intelligence collection facility at Lourdes, or signing
agreements for Russian military aircraft and warships
to have regular access to Cuban facilities.
In Nicaragua, which similarly seeks to balance
its relationship with the United States with that of
Russia, the United States might emphasize that continued Nicaraguan access to U.S. markets under the
provisions of the Central American Free Trade Agreement could be jeopardized by providing base access
to Russian warships, permitting Russian warships to
conduct large-scale “counternarcotics” patrols from
Nicaraguan ports, or expanding Russian intelligence
operations in the country, even if in the name of counterdrug patrols. At the same time, the United States
should also consider increasing the presence of U.S.
military forces in the Caribbean, providing implicit
security guarantees to, and increasing the level of,
operational coordination with those nations in the region most intimidated by growing Russian presence
in the region, including Colombia, Costa Rica, and
Honduras.
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The paradox of contemporary Russian re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean is that the
Russian political and military initiatives, which coincided with the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the current
conflict in the Ukraine, were most likely intended, in
part, to provide the nation with increased latitude
to maneuver in Eurasia by forcing the United States
to divert some of its attention away from the area in
order to address risks in the Western Hemisphere
“backyard.” Yet in the process, through its dramatic
actions, Russia has done the United States a favor,
highlighting the risks to the United States stemming
from potential Russian activities in the region, and in
the process giving the United States the opportunity
to address such vulnerabilities before a global crisis in
which Russia or another U.S. geopolitical rival might
seek to exploit them.
Yet the favor that Russia has done the United
States by highlighting the potential national security
risks to the United States through such engagement is
only an opportunity if the United States responds by
taking meaningful action to address them. Doing so
will require significant resources, yet the price of not
acting is potentially far greater than the nation is in a
position to pay.
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